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The passage of Turkey's landmark 1928 alphabet law, which replaced the Arabic-based 
Ottoman script with a Latin-based alphabet for writing Turkish, has been widely studied 
in terms of modernization and its implications for Turkish identity. However, there is a 
lack of scholarship regarding the significance of the Turkish script reform for Arab 
audiences. This thesis contributes to addressing the dearth in the literature by examining 
Arab intellectual perspectives on the Turkish script reform using influential Arabic 
sources contemporaneous with Turkey's passage of the alphabet law. The thesis makes 
two main assertions: first, that Arab observers at the time were deeply concerned with 
and closely followed developments on Turkey's alphabet change; and second, that the 
Turkish alphabet reform served as a framework within which these observers evaluated 
and renegotiated their own identities, and in the process, connected with or distanced 
themselves and their communities from Turkey. Highlighting the diverse ways in which 
Arab intellectuals understood the Turkish reform and discussed its pertinence to 
modernization in their own societies, this study examines religion-based approaches, as 
well as Arab and Egyptian nationalist and socialist perspectives. These works are 
valuable sites for exploring the Arab-Turkish relationship within the context of 
language, which contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the various 
components of this relationship, and how it has been shaped and reshaped over time. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
Arap harfli Osmanlıca yazının Latin harfli Türkçe'ye çevrilmesini öngören ve 
Türkiye'de bir dönüm noktası olan 1928 Harf Devrimi, modernizasyon ve bunun Türk 
kimliğine etkisi bağlamında çokça çalışılmıştır. Buna karşın, Türk Harf Devrimi'nin 
Araplar açısından önemi üzerine akademik çalışma eksiği bulunmaktadır. Bu çalışma, 
Türk Harf Kanunu'nun geçtiği tarihsel dönemdeki önemli Arap kaynaklarını kullanarak 
Arap entelektüellerin harf devrimine karşı bakış açılarını incelemeyi ve böylelikle 
literatürdeki boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmada iki temel sav öne 
sürülmektedir. Çalışmanın birinci savı, Arap gözlemcilerin Türkiye'deki alfabe 
değişiminden ötürü derin bir kaygı duyduğu ve konuyla yakından ilgilendiği 
yönündedir. Çalışmada öne sürülen ikinci sav ise Türk Harf Devriminin, Arapların kendi 
kimliklerini değerlendirip yeniden tartışmaya açtıkları ve bu süreçte Türkiye'ye 
yakınlaştıkları veya uzaklaştıkları bir düşünsel çerçeve görevi gördüğüdür. Arap 
entelektüellerin Türk harf devrimini nasıl anladıkları ve bu devrimin modernleşme ile 
ilişkisini kendi toplumlarında nasıl tartıştıkları ile ilgili farklılıkları ön plana çıkaran bu 
çalışma, dine dayalı yaklaşımlar ile Arap ve Mısırlı milliyetçi ve sosyalist yaklaşımları 
ele almaktadır. Söz konusu çalışmalar, çeşitli bileşkenler içeren Türk-Arap ilişkilerine 
daha incelikli bir bakışı açısı sunan dil bağlamından bakarak bu ilişkileri keşfetmek ve 
yine bu ilişkilerin zamanla yeniden ve nasıl şekillendiğini anlamak açısından çok 
değerlidir. 
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Note on Translation, Transliteration, and Designations 
 
 
 
 
All the translations in this thesis are by the author unless otherwise indicated. 
Specialized Arabic terminology is usually defined in the text, or explained with a simple 
definition provided in the footnotes. Transliteration generally follows the system 
employed by the International Journal of Middle East Studies. All Arabic or Turkish 
words are italicized and fully transliterated with diacritical marks, except for words 
which are widely used in English, such as Qur'an or shari'a. Diacritics are not preserved 
in personal names, place names, names of political parties and organizations, and titles 
of books and articles except for 'ayn and hamza.  
 
The script used for writing Ottoman is referred to in this thesis as an Arabic script, 
rather than as Arabo-Persian, although it should be noted that the script contains several  
additional letters used in Persian which are not found in Arabic. Furthermore, because 
of the varying forms Latin has taken over time, “Roman” is often preferred by 
researchers as the general designation for the script used in modern Turkish. However, 
the script is referred to here using the more common “Latin” or “Latin-based alphabet,” 
as these are the terms the Arabic texts presented in this thesis employ.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this work is to examine contemporary Arab perspectives on the Kemalist 
Turkish script reform, by looking at Arabic sources from around the same time period 
as, and shortly after, the passage of the 1928 alphabet law which banned the use of the 
Arabic-based Ottoman script and mandated the use of a Latin alphabet. The  idea for 
this study emerged from a discussion with one of my Turkish language instructors, Dr. 
Murat Cankara, who emphasized to me the usefulness of focusing on language and 
script as important aspects of Arab-Turkish relations. My broader interest in these 
groups' relationships and perceptions of each other was initially sparked by several 
encounters I experienced in Istanbul during an undergraduate study abroad trip to 
Turkey in 2007, where it became apparent to me that for many Turks of various 
backgrounds, the image of Arabs is generally associated with an array of negative 
connotations, most notably the idea that the Arabs betrayed the Ottomans and 'stabbed 
them in the back.'1 Since then, my awareness has only become more acute that peoples 
who have historically been very interconnected often rely on simplistic binaries, 
common stereotypes, and superficial reductions of the 'Other' in their understandings of 
one another. For example, discussions in Jordan with fellow students and colleagues, 
taxi drivers, friends, and relatives on Turkey inevitably ended up being framed within a 
narrative of brutal Ottoman colonialism in Arab lands, while more recently, I have 
found that my identifying as a Palestinian in Turkey is almost always met with 
significantly more positive reactions than the designation of 'Arab,' as the term 
Palestinian conjures up feelings of empathy and solidarity with Palestinians suffering 
under Israeli occupation.  
                                                
1 David Kushner, “Turkish-Syrian Relations: An Update,” in Modern Syria: From Ottoman Rule to 
Pivotal Role in the Middle East, ed. Moshe Ma'oz et al. (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1999), 
228. 
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The Turkish-Arab relationship, broadly defined, has increasingly become the subject of 
scholarly interest as well as popular discussion. Recent political developments, notably 
the Justice and Development Party's rise to power in Turkey in 2002 and the 'neo-
Ottomanist' style doctrine it advocates, called the “Strategic Depth” policy, have 
contributed to a period of greater Turkish-Arab connectedness, as Turkey assertively 
proclaims its determination more than ever to look eastward.2 Critical works on a range 
of areas such as Ottoman Orientalism, Turkification measures in the Ottoman Arab 
provinces, Arab perceptions of Mustafa Kemal's military successes and his abolition of 
the caliphate, Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, and Turkish-Arab economic 
relations together offer a nuanced perspective on the various components of this 
relationship, and how it has been shaped and reshaped over time.3  
 
However, there is a dearth in the literature with regards to the role language plays in the 
formation and expression of Turkish and Arab mutual perceptions, and in the shaping of 
historically interconnected identities that continue to be increasingly linked today.  With 
                                                
2 See Kılıç Buğra Kanat,“AK Party's Foreign Policy: Is Turkey Turning Away From the West?” Insight 
Turkey 12:1 (2010): 205-225; and Alexander Murinson, “The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Foreign 
Policy,” Middle Eastern Studies 42:6 (2006): 945-964. 
3 Examples of such work include Ussama Makdisi, “Rethinking Ottoman Imperialism: Modernity, 
Violence and the Cultural Logic of Ottoman Reform,” in The Empire and the City: Arab Provincial 
Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire, ed. Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp and Stefan Weber (Beirut: 
Ergon Verlag, 2002); Selim Deringil, ““They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery:” The Late 
Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate,”Comparative Studies in Society and History 45:2 
(2003): 311-342; Rifaat Abou-el-Haj, “The Social Uses of the Past: Recent Arab Historiography of 
Ottoman Rule,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 14 (1982): 185-201; Sabri Sayari, 
"Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990's," Journal of Palestine Studies 26:3 (1997): pp. 44-55; Dan 
Tschirgi, “Turkey and the Arab World in the New Millenium,” in Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21st 
Century: A Changing Role in World Politics, ed. Tareq Y. Ismael and Mustafa Aydın (Burlington: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), 103-120; Basheer Nafi, "The Arabs and Modern Turkey: A 
Century of Changing Perceptions," Insight Turkey 11:1 (2009): 63-82; Anoushiravan Ehteshami and 
Süleyman Elik, “Turkey's Growing Relations with Iran and Arab Middle East,” Turkish Studies 12:4 
(2011): 643-662; Bülent Aras, “Turkey and the GCC: An Emerging Relationship,” Middle East Policy 
12:4 (2005): 89-97; Pamela Ann Smith, “Turkey: the New Economic Power in MENA?” Middle East 
427 (2011): 48-49; Mahmut B. Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 
1950's to the 1990's,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 25:1 (1993): 91-110; O. Bengio 
and G. Özcan, "Old Grievances, New Fears: Arab Perceptions of Turkey and its Alignment with 
Israel," Middle Eastern Studies 37:2 (2001): 50-92; Lemi Baruh and Mihaela Popescu, 
“Communicating Turkish-Islamic Identity in the Aftermath of the Gaza Flotilla Raid: Who is the “Us” 
in “Us” versus “Them”?” New Perspectives on Turkey 45 (2011): 75-99; Alexandra Buccianti, 
“Turkish Soap Operas in the Arab World: Social Liberation or Cultural Alienation?” Arab Media and 
Society 10 (2010), 
http://www.arabmediasociety.com/articles/downloads/20100330130359_Buccianti_-_for_PDF.pdf; 
Christa Salamandra, “The Muhannad Effect: Media Panic, Melodrama, and the Arab Female Gaze,” 
Anthropological Quarterly 85:1 (2012): 45-77.  
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this thesis, I seek to contribute to the ongoing scholarly work on Turkish-Arab relations 
by examining contemporary Arabic sources on the Turkish alphabet change. Through an 
exploration of the various ways in which the Turkish script reform was understood and 
grappled with by Arabs at the time, my aim is to emphasize two main assertions: first, 
that Arab observers at the time were deeply concerned with and closely followed 
developments on the alphabet change in Turkey; and second, that the Turkish alphabet 
reform served as a framework within which these observers evaluated and renegotiated 
their own identities, and in the process, connected with or distanced themselves and 
their communities from Turkey.  
 
Recognizing the relationship linking these groups is important to understanding why the 
developments surrounding the alphabet reform in Turkey were of significance to Arab 
audiences across the spectrum of religion and ideology. While there were naturally local 
events taking place in various parts of the Arab world at the time that occupied the 
minds of  journalists, scholars, and average citizens, this did not take away from the fact 
that a large segment of Arab society had until only recently been joined together with 
Turks as Ottoman subjects. Arab nationalists struggled to produce programs of action as 
revolts against European colonialism in the region spread, Egyptian independence had 
been newly declared with the establishment of the Kingdom of Egypt in the early 1920s, 
and the question of the governorate of Alexandretta was a thorny issue for Arabs in 
Syria and remains so today. However, these Arab peoples were still very much 
connected to the legacy of the empire, the continuation of which they saw in the 
developments of the Turkish republic's early years. Particularly for many Muslim Arabs, 
the Ottoman state had been of great symbolic importance, representing Islamic power 
first as an empire and caliphate, and then in the form of a modern state headed by a 
Muslim leader who had triumphed in the face of European colonialism. It is reasonable 
to conclude that this connection perpetuated their interest in the state's affairs well after 
it was clear that the Kemalist regime was determined to create a secular system of 
governance.  
 
Another reason for Arab invested concern in the Turkish alphabet reform has to do with 
the centrality of the Arabic language and its script for Arabs, both Muslim and 
 4 
otherwise. Although the significance of the Arabic language as a unifying mechanism 
for all Arabs has been exaggerated and exploited in Arab nationalist rhetoric, it 
nonetheless holds true that Arabic occupies a unique position of value to many Muslim 
Arabs due to its religious standing as the language of the Qur'an. It comes as no surprise 
then that such blatant efforts by the Kemalist regime to distance its society from the 
Arabic script, as well as to purge the Turkish language from Arabic and Persian 
loanwords, would be interpreted by many religiously-inclined Muslims around the 
world as an explicit attack on Islam, and one that was likely to spread to other Muslim 
countries. As such, Muslim Arab engagement with and reactions to the Turkish script 
reform events were often driven by genuine fear for the state of their religion.  
 
As for Arab nationalists who were less concerned with Islam, commentary on the events 
in Turkey varied in focus. The Turkish script changes provided inspiration for Arab and 
Orientalist European proposals on the feasibility of implementing similar changes in the 
Arab world. On the one hand, proponents of the idea that the Arabic alphabet was 
hindering progress in the Arab world heralded the Turkish example as a successful 
model for modernizing Arab nations to follow. On the other hand, proposals on 
Latinizing the Arabic script were rejected by some on the grounds that they were yet 
another mechanism of European colonialism by which to attack the Arabic language, 
and divide and weaken the Arabs.   
 
Arabic writings on the Turkish alphabet reform are a valuable source for exploring how 
their authors tackled the rapid changes taking place in the world around them, as great 
power dynamics shifted and the realization that their societies lagged behind Europe in 
development and modernization became increasingly apparent. As “the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I pushed Arabs to redefine themselves 
outside of the Ottoman parameters and to articulate post-Ottoman visions for 
themselves,”4Arab debates on language and script reforms took on profound meaning as 
arenas for renegotiating identity. The texts presented here engage with the Turkish 
example from varying angles, understanding its significance and implications for the 
                                                
4 Elizabeth S. Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought: Cultural Critique in Comparative Perspective 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 19. 
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authors' communities differently. In doing so, they all seek to firmly reassert value 
within the different groups their authors identify with.  
 
These texts also provide us with important insight into what Trix calls the authors' 
“scriptal environments,”5 or their attitudes toward scripts in their particular social 
spaces. Echoed throughout all of the texts is the notion that language, with script as its 
visible expression, defines a civilization and clearly marks its members' position among 
other groups as modern or traditional, advanced or backward, powerful or weak, 
religious or secular. One text, for example, maintains that the use of the Arabic script in 
Syria illustrates the Syrian people's insistence on defining themselves first and foremost 
as Arab, connected to their Arab brethren in other countries. In others, a switch to a 
Latin-based alphabet in Egypt would serve to distinguish Egypt as a modern, developed 
nation. They all illustrate one of Suleiman's arguments about the symbolic function of 
written language in general and of the Arabic script in particular:  
[T]he symbolic function of language is not restricted to its verbal 
dimension alone; it also extends to its written manifestation. This is 
particularly true of Arabic, whose script plays an important role as a 
boundary marker, particularly vis-a-vis the Latin and Cyrillic scripts 
which have gained at its expense by the “defection” to these scripts of 
Turkish, Malay and a host of other languages in Central Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa ...Yet, in spite of these defections, the Arabic script still 
functions like Chinese characters to create a community out of signs not 
sounds, not just with respect to the Islamic culture at whose centre the 
Qur’an stands, but also in the context of the civic and cultural 
conceptualizations of the nation in the Arabic-speaking countries.6 
 
Although the writers of the texts examined in this thesis took different positions on the 
Turkish alphabet reform, all agreed that script is of central importance in constructing 
and expressing individual identities, as well as conveying meaning and value in regards 
to group-level identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 Frances Trix, “The Stamboul Alphabet Of Shemseddin Sami Bey: Precursor To Turkish Script 
Reform,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 31 (1999): 255. 
6 Yasir Suleiman, The Arabic Language and National Identity: A Study in Ideology (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 33. 
 6 
1.1. Sources 
 
 
A number of considerations influenced the selection of sources for examination in this 
study. First, with the aim of researching texts that provided as contemporary or fresh a 
perspective as possible on the issue, I limited sources to those published within a time 
frame of roughly fifteen years from the date of the Turkish alphabet reform law. The 
texts presented here range from the late 1920s to the early 40s, including one text 
published after Mustafa Kemal's lifetime.  
 
Second, in researching sources that had potential for valuable study in this thesis, I 
attempted to survey a number of authors whose various religious, social, and ideological 
backgrounds would be representative of the diversity of trends in contemporary Arab 
intellectual thought around the time of the Turkish alphabet reform. The authors 
selected here include men who are Muslim and Christian, religiously-inclined and 
secular in their approaches, and hailing from two major Arab countries, Syria and 
Egypt. A lack of sources authored by women at the time on the subject of language 
reform narrowed the selection to male writers. The fact that a majority of these texts 
were published in Cairo does not limit the scope of perspectives presented. During 
Ottoman times, Cairo was a birthplace and center for proliferation of new intellectual 
ideas and activities, like protonationalist movements. This, as Kassab explains, was due 
to the margin of freedom it enjoyed compared to other parts of the Ottoman empire 
where state censorship was more strict.7    
 
Third, the texts examined here were authored by recognized intellectuals whose 
thoughts and writings developed within the context of an Arab awakening, and had far-
reaching influence across the Arab world. Muhammad Rashid Rida's al-Manar al-
Islami, for example, is a primary publication of Islamist modernist reform ideology, 
while Salama Musa's works on script reform within his broader writings on 
                                                
7 Kassab, 19. 
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modernization, socialism, and Egyptian nationalism are an important representation of 
Christian Arab thinkers' protests against religious exclusiveness.8  
 
Finally, practical considerations, including the accessibility of sources and the necessity 
to limit the scope of this thesis, served to constrain the final selection chosen for 
analysis here. There are numerous Arabic sources that touch on the Turkish alphabet 
reform available to researchers. This study is an effort to address a largely unexplored 
but intriguing facet of Arab-Turkish relations and these groups' mutual perceptions, and 
aims to contribute to the broader scholarly work  in this important area.  
 
The chapters of this thesis follow a general thematic grouping of the texts, a design 
which simultaneously arranges the texts in chronological order. Chapter 2 provides a 
brief review of the literature on language, scripts, and identity, and on the history of 
alphabet reforms in the Ottoman empire and Turkey. Chapter 3 examines articles 
published in various issues of the famous Islamic reform journal, al-Manar al-Islami, 
by three different authors, Rashid Rida, 'Abd al-Hamid al-Rafi'i, and Shakib Arslan.  
Framing the Turkish script reform as an explicit attack on Islam, these articles share a 
common opposition to the alphabet change law in Turkey, and fear the danger of the 
possible spread of similar anti-Islamic sentiments to other segments of the greater 
Muslim community, or umma. For these authors, their connection to Arabic stems from 
their religious conviction regarding Arabic's Islamic value as the language in which the 
word of God was revealed. Like the texts explored in the other chapters of this thesis, 
the writings from al-Manar tackle the Turkish alphabet reform within the broader 
context of modernization and development, as their authors were deeply aware that the 
Muslim umma lagged significantly behind the West in scientific and industrial progress. 
The cause for this, as they saw it, was Muslims' deviation from true Islam; returning to 
Islam was the solution for bringing Muslims to the forefront, rather than relying on 
westernization efforts such as Latinizing the Arabic alphabet. 
 
Chapter 4 looks at an article from 1930 published in the official journal of the 
influential Arabic Language Academy of Damascus by a member of the Academy, Faris 
                                                
8 Majid Khadduri, Political Trends in the Arab World: The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 92. 
 8 
al-Khuri. His Arab nationalist approach rejects Orientalist European proposals to reform 
the Arabic script in Syria following the successful Turkish example. Within the context 
of modernization, al-Khuri tackles the concern of typing and printing the Arabic 
alphabet, and the challenges that it posed. Although he admits that the Arabic script in 
its form at the time was not ideal for printing, he maintained that a few simple 
adjustments to the letter forms and diacritical marks would achieve for the Arabic script 
a perfection in its typed form to match the perfection of all other aspects of the 
language. In rejecting proposals to reform Arabic along the lines of the Turkish model, 
al-Khuri draws on a historical legacy that reaches back farther than Islam to argue that 
Arabic is an inherently superior language to all others, laying out a series of arguments 
meant to prove the language's distinguished linguistic qualities. Making no mention of 
Arabic's religious significance, he emphasizes the language's importance as a unifier of 
all Arab nations, and refutes a need for the kind of script change Turkey underwent.  
 
Chapter 5 explores two books by Egyptian authors, Muhammad Muhammad Tawfiq and 
Salama Musa. Tawfiq's book is a biography of Mustafa Kemal from 1936, considered 
even today to be a prime Arabic biographical source on the life of Turkey's first 
president, while Musa's book from 1945 examines Arabic's place within modern 
rhetoric. Both authors create a fundamental link between a society's written language 
and its ability to fully modernize and achieve scientific and industrial development like 
that of the West. Tawfiq's focus is on his conviction that Latinizing the Turkish alphabet 
was a watershed event which paved the way for the implementation of other important 
modernizing reforms. Musa pinpoints Arabic and its then current script as the major 
cause for the overall backwardness of Egyptian society, calling for a complete reform 
and Latinization of the alphabet. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by bringing together the 
main observations from the various chapters, and putting forth suggestions for possible 
future research ideas. 
 
One of the goals of this thesis has been to include translations of large sections of the 
original texts wherever possible. Because full English versions of the works are not 
currently available, the aim is to provide readers with a glimpse into the original 
writings to allow them a deeper engagement with the material. This thesis is by no 
 9 
means a search for an absolute in terms of an Arab perspective on the Turkish alphabet 
reform; rather, it seeks to provide a comparative examination and exploration of 
intersections, diversities, and anxieties in these writings. Examined together, they give 
us a more nuanced understanding of the nature of Arab debate and perspectives on 
Turkish developments which the authors deemed pertinent to a reevaluation of their 
own lives and identities, as well as those of their larger communities and Turkey itself. 
 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. LANGUAGE, SCRIPTS, AND IDENTITY: SITUATING THE TURKISH 
ALPHABET REFORM HISTORICALLY 
 
 
 
2.1. Why Examine Scripts? 
 
The subject of Turkish language reform has been dealt with extensively in recent 
scholarship. However, a focus on the Turkish alphabet change from an Arabic to a Latin 
script and its consequences beyond Turkish society has been relatively unexplored. As 
such, interesting, important insights into relationships between Turks, Arabs, and other 
peoples with strong attachments to the Arabic script, at a critical time in their shared 
history, have been missing.  
 
Language, and by extension, its script, is a crucial intersection of socio-political 
processes and identity. Interest in the relationship between language and identity has 
become increasingly prominent since the early 1980s, with the production of such 
seminal works as John Gumperz's 1982 book Language and Social Identity, the 1985 
Acts of Identity, authored by Robert Le Page and  Andrée Tabouret-Keller, and John 
Edwards' Language, Society and Identity, also from 1985. While scholars employ a 
plethora of definitions for the notion of identity, in the simplest of terms, “identity is at 
the heart of the person, and the group, and the connective tissue that links them.”9 
Identity, as the characteristics that belong to us and the way we think about ourselves, 
encompasses a paradox of both sameness and difference: on the one hand, we are 
identical with ourselves and others, sharing common attributes, but on the other, we are 
unique, or different, from others.10 Identities are multifaceted, inevitably shifting, and 
                                                
9 John Edwards, Language and Identity: An Introduction, Key Topics in Sociolinguistics Series, ed. 
Rajend Mesthrie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 2. 
10 Steph Lawler, Identity: Sociological Perspectives (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 2. 
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can at once be varying and contradictory, stretching across the individual and group 
levels.  
 
What is important for this thesis is that identity is connected to language in a way that is 
fundamental to our experience of being human.11 Joseph explains that “our very sense 
of who we are, where we belong and why, and how we relate to those around us, all 
have language at their centre.”12 Language provides a way to form communities; it 
binds members of these communities together, and allows individuals to display their 
value as members of their communities to others.13 Language has the power to make 
and unmake groups,14 and historically has been a crucial element in the process of 
constructing and reproducing national identities. Joseph presents the example of the 
British Isles in explaining how national languages are often designed as part of the 
ideological process of constructing nationalism: 
To take the example of the British Isles (a term which is itself offensive 
to Irish nationalists but for which no alternative has been established), 
for centuries their linguistic pattern was a patchwork of local dialects, 
Germanic or Celtic in origin. Only in modern times did individuals 
motivated by nationalistic ambitions of various sorts set about to 
establish ‘languages’ for the nations of England, Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales, as well as for Cornwall and other smaller regions (which often 
constitute ‘nations’ in the eyes of their more fervent partisans).15 
 
The way in which language is intertwined with individual and group identities in the 
context of constructing national identity is especially pertinent with respect to linguistic 
engineering under the Kemalist regime and how it fit within a larger agenda of building 
a Turkish national identity. Linguistic engineering is defined here as a deliberate attempt 
to modify the linguistic behavior of a particular community to achieve a particular aim,  
and in the Turkish case, language was intentionally manipulated to help create a sense 
of 'groupness,' or shared characteristics, that bound people together at a level deeper 
than ethnicity. As Gumperz and Cook-Gumperz argue, “social identity [is]...in large part 
                                                
11 Carmen Llamas and Dominic Watt, introduction to Language and Identities, ed. Carmen Llamas and 
Dominic Watt (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 1. 
12 John E. Joseph, “Identity,”  in Llamas and Watt, 9. 
13 Jean-Louis Dessalles, Why We Talk: The Evolutionary Origins of Language, trans. James Grieve (New 
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14  Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson 
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established and maintained through language,”16 and this has certainly not been unique 
to Turkey.17 Cooper provides the example of the French Academy as a regulatory body 
established early on to purify French and determine its grammar, spelling, and 
literature.18 In Malaysia, a strict national language policy was implemented in the late 
1960s in an effort to improve national cohesion and upgrade the status of the Malay 
language.19 Language planning in China sought a nationally recognized and 
standardized modern spoken language, and a simplified written style to increase the 
spread of literacy.20 However, as Geoffrey Lewis notes, the Kemalist campaign in 
Turkey is distinguished from other cases because it was unparalleled both in its 
effectiveness and the length of time for which it was sustained.21  
 
Although the subject of Turkish language reform in general has been dealt with 
extensively in recent scholarship, a particular focus on the alphabet change and its 
consequences not only for Turks, but for other peoples with strong attachments to the 
Arabic script, has been relatively unexplored. Scripts, as the written expression of 
language, are especially important to examine, for as Diringer puts it, “writing has been 
the foundation for the development of [man's] consciousness and his intellect, his 
comprehension of himself and the world about him, and in the very widest sense 
possible, of his critical spirit – indeed, of all that we today regard as his unique heritage 
and his raison d'étre.”22 The development of writing entailed that a far greater amount 
of information could be systematically recorded than could be memorized, and allowed 
for the widespread dissemination of knowledge as ideas could be preserved and 
communicated much more broadly.  
 
                                                
16 John J. Gumperz and Jenny Cook-Gumperz, “Introduction: Language and the Communication of 
Social Identity,” in Language and Social Identity, Studies in Interactional Sociolinguistics 2, ed. John 
J. Gumperz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 7. 
17 For examples, see case studies in Robert B. Kaplan and Richard B. Baldauf Jr., Language Planning: 
From Practice to Theory (Bristol: Multilingual Matters Ltd, 1997). 
18 Robert L. Cooper,  Language Planning and Social Change (Cambridge: University of Cambridge 
Press, 1989), 3-11. 
19 Kaplan and Baldauf, 196-197. 
20 A detailed history can be found in Ping Chen, Modern Chinese: History and Sociolinguistics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  
21 Geoffrey Lewis, The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 2. 
22 David Diringer, Writing, Ancient Peoples and Places 25 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1962), 19. 
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Within studies of linguistics for much of the twentieth century, writing was long ignored 
in favor of a focus on speech as “real” language. Sampson gives several reasons for this, 
arguing that the emphasis of twentieth century linguists on spoken language was a 
reaction to older traditions of language study which focused on writing in evaluating 
'good' and 'bad' linguistic usages. Additionally, perceiving spoken language as, opposed 
to writing, as 'natural' stems from a biological standpoint, which views speech as the 
main characteristic distinguishing humans from other species.23 Since humans have 
been speaking much longer than they have been writing, and because spoken language 
precedes reading and writing as the first form of language individuals in literate 
communities learn, writing was long perceived as a cultural rather than a biological 
phenomenon, as mere technology rather than an essential part of human nature.24 As 
such, the notion that “speech is central and writing peripheral” long dominated the 
scholarship on language.25  
 
The intricate connection of language, and by extension, its script, with notions of 
identity is particularly strong in the case of Arabic. The unifying role of the Arabic 
script reached and continues to reach well beyond speakers of the Arabic language. 
Arabic and the way it is written have a central importance to Islam as a common 
language uniting a community of believers in daily worship and social interactions. The 
language of the Qur'an set the standard for a unified literary language in contrast to the 
various dialects of Arabia. Regardless of their mother tongues, Muslims of diverse 
backgrounds memorize and recite the Qur'an, as well as various supplications and 
prophetic traditions, in Arabic. The Qur'an itself continuously re-affirms its attribute of 
having been revealed in Arabic: “Indeed, We have sent it down as an Arabic Qur'an that 
you might understand;” “this is a confirming Book in an Arabic tongue to warn those 
who have wronged and as good tidings to the doers of good;” “[i]n a clear, Arabic 
language.”26 The style of the Qur'an's language is often pointed to as unparalleled, with 
its composition that is neither verse nor free-form, and its exquisite figures of speech 
                                                
23 Geoffrey Sampson, Writing Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 11-13. 
24 Florian Coulmas, Writing Systems: An Introduction to Their Linguistic Analysis, Cambridge 
Textbooks in Linguistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 10. 
25 Sampson, 13. 
26 The Qur'an, trans. Sahih International (Jeddah: Abul-Qasim Publishing House: 1997), 12:2; 46:12; 
26:195. 
 14 
and rhetorical devices. The Qur'an challenges anyone to produce a comparable work: 
“Say, "If mankind and the jinn gathered in order to produce the like of this Qur'an, they 
could not produce the like of it ...”27   
 
The Arabic script represents the written expression of words which are believed by 
Muslims to have been revealed to humanity directly from God, and acts as a means of 
transmitting and spreading these words. As Bernard Lewis puts it, “[f]or the believer, 
the text of the Koran – including the script in which it is written – is uncreated, eternal, 
and divine.”28 The script is used to decorate mosques, with calligraphic compositions of 
the names of God, or verses from the Qur'an. The link between writing and religion is 
close in Islam as it is in many other societies, with script acting as a clear indicator of 
one's religious affiliations. Bhatia illustrates the connection between religious identity 
and script with the example of the Punjabi language, which is often written by Sikh 
Punjabis in the Gurmukhi script, by Hindu Punjabis in the Devanagri script, and by 
Muslim Punjabis in the Arabic-based Shahmukhi script.29 The influence of Christianity 
among the people of Malta renders Maltese a particularly interesting example of an 
Arabic-based language written in a Latin alphabet.30 Lewis further emphasizes the 
significance of scripts for religion using the example of the Ottoman world: 
The language of the South Slavs is written in Latin letters by the Catholic 
Croats, in Cyrillic by the orthodox Serbs. In Syria the common Arabic 
language has been written in Arabic script by Muslims, in Syriac by 
Christians, in Hebrew script by Jews. Greek-speaking Muslims in Crete 
wrote Greek in Arabic letters, while Turkish-speaking Christians in 
Anatolia wrote Turkish in Greek or Armenian letters, according to their 
Church. Not language, but script was the visible and outward sign 
distinguishing Muslim from unbeliever.31 
 
                                                
27 Ibid, 17:88. 
28 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, second ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 
1967), 425. 
29 Tej K. Bhatia, “Major Regional Languages,” in Language in South Asia, ed. Braj B. Kachru, Yamuna 
Kachru, and S.N. Sridhar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 128. 
30 See H. Russell Bernard, “Languages and Scripts in Contact: Historical Perspectives,” in Literacy: An 
International Handbook, 1st edition, ed. by Daniel A. Wagner, Richard L. Venezky, and Brian V. Street 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 23; Manwel Mifsud, Loan Verbs in Maltese: A Descriptive and 
Comparative Study (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 28-31. See also Karla Mallette, European Modernity 
and the Arab Mediterranean: Toward a New Philology and a Counter-Orientalism (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010). 
31 B. Lewis, 427. 
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The added level of meaning found in Muslims' attachment to Arabic and its script due to 
the language's religious significance makes an examination of Arab perspectives on the 
Turkish alphabet change particularly interesting, as people's reactions and opinions 
could be quite charged. However, it is important to note that a belief in Arabic and its 
script's value does not always draw on religious significance as a source for legitimacy. 
Arab reactions, positive and negative, to abandoning the Arabic script for a Latin 
alphabet were often not connected to Arabic's religious significance to the Muslim 
world. As will be explored in the texts in the following chapters, opposition to adopting 
a Latin script for Arabic has also been framed within an argument positing Arabic's rich 
historical legacy, reaching back to pre-Islamic Arab society. 
 
Because this thesis refers to Arabic, the question might arise as to whether there is a 
single 'Arabic' that all Arabs have a similar attachment to. In the introduction to his 
book on language and identity in Lebanon, Salameh argues against the notion that an 
'Arabic language' can refer to a single speech form belonging to a uniform cultural 
mass. He critiques scholarship on the Middle East that is “too often beholden to the 
biases and orthodoxies of Arabism and Arab nationalism,”32 and argues that there is 
little connecting most Arabs and Muslims to a language that he claims is both arcane 
and repressive, “alien and incomprehensible to more than one-half of the 300 million 
presumptive members of the 'Arab nation' and the 'Arab world,'”and not natively spoken 
nor used as the medium of daily spontaneous human interaction.33 According to 
Salameh, the relationship between Arabic and Arabs is not a natural one, one of a 
“living” language emanating “from living minds by way of a lively dynamic garrulous 
mouth,” but a relationship of blind commitment to a language that “demands undivided 
submission to its divine autarchy.”34  
 
While this thesis does not seek to fall into the trap that Salameh criticizes, its purpose is 
also not to define who the Arabs are, what Arabic is, or how natural the relationship 
between them is. It does, however, assume a basic belief in the validity of emotions and 
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34 Ibid, xxii 
 16 
opinions expressed by the authors of the texts examined here who identified as Arabs 
and wrote in Arabic. Arabic does not carry the same meaning and value for every 
Middle Easterner or Arabic speaker. The goal of this thesis is to explore what the 
language and its written expression mean to those who do express an attachment to it. 
The diverse perspectives presented in this study, put forth by authors of varying 
religious and cultural backgrounds, all center around the idea that Arabic was a 
fundamental element shaping their lives and their understandings of who they were.  
 
 
 
2.2. The Kemalist Reforms 
 
 
The Turkish language was not always written in the Arabic script. Early Orkhon 
inscriptions in a runiform script, which Findley explains was ultimately derived from 
Aramaic, have been found and dated back to the eighth century,35 while the Uyghur 
alphabet was used later on across Central Asia.36 The Arabic script was not adopted for 
writing Turkish until Turkic peoples converted to Islam around the tenth century, such 
as in the case of the Seljuks and later, the Ottomans. Debates about the problematic 
nature of the Arabic script for representing Turkish, along with concrete efforts at script 
reform, began long before Mustafa Kemal's initiatives in the 1920s. The Arabic script 
was perceived to be ill-suited for conveying many sounds and forms of Turkish, and in 
Ottoman Turkish, the gap between spelling and pronunciation was immense. Private 
individuals and groups during Ottoman times made various attempts at both modifying 
the Arabic script that was already in use for Ottoman, as well as considering an entirely 
new Latin-based script. Berkes locates the beginning of a shift to focusing on script 
reform within the modernizing period of the 19th century Tanzimat, as interest in 
disseminating the Ottoman language through literacy increased:  
[T]he language problem as an important object of reform in the drive for 
modernization and secularization did not seem solved as long as it was 
taken merely as a matter of cultivating Ottoman. The experiences of the 
new school teaching and of the press demonstrated the negative effects 
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of the enormous gap existing between the literate language of the elite 
and the Turkish language of the common people. As the difference 
between the two was believed to be only a difference between literacy 
and illiteracy, the necessity of facilitating the dissemination of the 
Ottoman [sic] through literacy began to appear the real crux of the 
language problem. Thus interest shifted from language to script – to the 
means of its dissemination through reading and writing.37 
  
Mehmed Tahir Münif Pasha, founder of the Ottoman Scientific Society, believed the 
Arabic script to be a major obstacle to education and the spread of literacy in the 
empire, and called for systematic reform. In 1862, he gave a speech to the Society 
arguing that Turkish words written in the Arabic script could be pronounced multiple 
ways, leading to confusion and difficulties in comprehension. The lack of accurate 
representation of Turkish vowels, as well as the problematic letter kef, which could 
stand for four different sound possibilities, were two of the major concerns with regards 
to using the Arabic script which Münif Pasha tried to illustrate. As 'European writing' 
did not present such problems, the Pasha believed that more people could more easily 
become literate with a script change. He opted for spacing letters rather than joining 
them, using vowels placed between the letters on the same line instead of above or 
below it, and acknowledged that a trial period would be necessary with limited 
publications in the new script before the general public would fully accept it.38     
 
Similarly, in the 1850s, Azeri author and playwright Mirza Feth-'Ali Ahundzade was 
already working on a series of reforms to the Arabic script to more adequately represent 
Turkish vowels. By 1863, he presented a proposal in Istanbul with his modifications 
that was eventually reviewed by the Ottoman Scientific Society, and which argued that 
the existing script was causing illiteracy. He believed that the script problem was not a 
religious issue, and that there should be no religious-based opposition to implementing 
changes. His reformed script offered new symbols set between letters to act as 
connective diacritical marks instead of the traditional dots and diacritics that were 
placed above or below the line. He suggested that his script be used alongside the 
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existing one during a period of transition.39 Although he was well-received, the majority 
opinion was that his proposal would be difficult to implement and would end up 
disconnecting people from ancient Islamic works.40  
 
Shemseddin Sami Bey, or Sami Frashëri, an Ottoman author and lexicographer of 
Albanian origin, turned to Latin in formulating a new alphabet for writing his native 
Albanian.41 Also, in his well-known Kamus-i Turki, he relied on various diacritical 
marks above the Arabic letter wāw to differentiate between the Turkish vowels o, ö, u, 
and ü.42 From 1913 onwards, Enver Pasha experimented with a modified Arabic script 
that was supposed to be better suited to adopting German military terms and simpler for 
use in military telegraphs. Known as the huruf-u munfasıla, or 'disjointed letters,' the 
script relied on the use of only the final forms of letters, with different forms of alif, 
wāw, and yā written on the line representing vowels.43 The result was impractical and 
the scheme was eventually abandoned. Around this time, several Young Turk authors 
like Hüseyin Cahit, Abdullah Cevdet, and Celal Nuri were openly arguing that 
something more than a simple reform of the existing script was needed, and advocating 
the adoption of the Latin alphabet.44 Although Bernard Lewis dismisses these early 
reform proposals, claiming that “nothing very much had come of them,”45 Ertürk argues 
that in a period characterized by the emergence of phonocentric writing, the debates of 
the Tanzimat were crucial in identifying a worrisome gap between the written and 
spoken languages, which the various proposals “understood as blocking the direct 
communicative 'travel' of words freed of authorial presence.”46 This period and its 
debates are significant as marking the beginning phases of the nationalization of the 
Ottoman Turkish language, and presenting the notion “of a state society bound by a 
common language.”47    
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Even though discussions about adopting a Latin script took place in 1923 at the Izmir 
economic congress, and in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (GNA) in 1924, there 
was still significant opposition to the idea from conservative and religious circles. The 
decision of the Turkic republics of the Soviet Union to adopt the Latin alphabet in 1926 
provided further drive for discussions about the issue within Turkey. Mustafa Kemal 
himself had long been interested in the subject of replacing the Arabic alphabet with a 
Latin one,48 and eventually, under his leadership, opposition to the idea was silenced. In 
the summer of 1928, Mustafa Kemal established a Language Commission to determine 
how to best adapt the Latin alphabet for the sounds of the Turkish language, and later 
that summer, officially announced that the Arabic-based Ottoman script would be 
replaced with a new Turkish alphabet. Instead of spending time on an extended 
transitional period as initially recommended by the Language Commission, he favored 
an abrupt switch, proclaiming an 'alphabet mobilization' to teach the new alphabet to the 
masses, and personally toured the country with a chalkboard explaining the new letters 
and urging people to teach them to their fellow countrymen.49 In a symbolic move to 
mark the transition, he ordered all ship names to be repainted at once using the new 
alphabet.50 On November 1 of 1928, law 1353 on the adoption and implementation of 
the new Turkish alphabet was passed, formalizing the change and making use of the 
new alphabet compulsory in all public communication starting from January 1, 1929.51 
 
Although the alphabet change was heralded by its proponents as the best possible 
solution for bridging the language gap, increasing literacy, and spreading education in 
the country, it is clear that there were other motivations underlying it. As Zürcher 
argues, despite the rational arguments for adopting a Latin alphabet, “the reason 
Mustafa Kemal and his followers pushed it through so energetically was undoubtedly 
ideological: it was yet another way to cut off Turkish society from its Ottoman and 
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Middle Eastern Islamic traditions and to reorient it towards the West.”52 One of the most 
drastic measures towards achieving secularization undertaken by the Kemalist reform 
program, doing away with the Arabic script entailed both a symbolic and practical break 
with the past. In the transformation of Turkish society from a multilingual empire to a 
monolingual nation state, the new alphabet served “both as a practical tool for a new 
kind of citizen and as a major, or even the main, badge of this new nationality.”53 
Attacking the traditional strongholds of institutionalized Islam, religious symbols, and 
popular Islam, the Kemalist regime did not seek to merely separate religion and state, 
but instead took firm control of religion and claimed “all visible expression of authority 
as a monopoly of the state,” with laws that secularized the legal system and education, 
abolished venerable religious positions in favor of directorates attached directly to the 
prime minister's office, banned traditional headgear and restricted religious attire to the 
mosques, adopted the Western clock and calender, and even changed the official day of 
rest to Sunday rather than Friday.54 In a series of steps aimed at giving the Turkish state 
a less Islamic character, “there remained one symbol, potent and universal, that bound 
her to the Orient – the Arabic script,” and this soon “follow[ed] the Caliphate and the 
Holy Law into oblivion.”55 At a practical level, the replacement of the Arabic alphabet 
with Latin, along with measures such as the calender change, made Turkey's recent 
Ottoman  inaccessible to its people under the new state, allowing the republic to “set 
itself in a new temporal plane and cut ties with the Ottoman past as the nationalist 
historians rewrote the history of the Turkish nation in creation.”56  
 
A key feature of linguistic modification is that it is frequently a top-down phenomenon. 
Engineered at the top, language reform is “primarily a socio-political, not a linguistic 
and cultural, process” formulated mainly by generals, politicians, and social ideologues, 
then disseminated at the popular level such that “its effects remain to colour the speech 
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and literature of succeeding generations.”57 This is certainly true of the Turkish case, 
where the elite played the main role in shaping and pushing through practices that 
constructed a particular image of national identity. The alphabet reform was 
implemented with impressive speed, and gained widespread acceptance from the public, 
although the old script continued to be used in private writings and correspondence until 
the 1960s by people who had received their educations prior to 1928. The state system 
that Mustafa Kemal and the modernizing elites had created, coupled with what 
historians point to as Mustafa Kemal's authoritarian nature and inability to accept 
opposition,58 allowed for such swiftness in implementing the change. A dictatorship of 
Mustafa Kemal's  one-party regime was “made possible by the principle of Populism 
and its claim that all interests in the state are embodied in the party and represented by 
its president,”59 and the “total project” of “embracing and internalizing all the cultural 
dimensions that made Europe modern,” which the regime believed was the best way for 
their new country to modernize, took the form of top-down impositions of institutions, 
beliefs, and behavior deemed to be in line with European standards. In his article 
“Whither the Project of Modernity?” Keyder points out the problematic aspects of this 
authoritarian top-down project. Obsessed with simply pushing through modernization, 
to become “modern” as opposed to “traditional,” without a commitment to real 
democratic values and an actual transformation toward organizational efficiency and 
rationality, state modernization left very little room for local culture or individual 
identity, and “accepted no adulteration of modernity with a qualifying adjective such as 
Islamic or Turkish.”60 Furthermore, as the question of modernity became linked with 
nationalism, the state placed an emphasis on homogeneity and collective purpose, 
stemming from ethnic unity, and “expressed in a single voice.”61 This provided a basis 
for justifying the state's often extremely violent and deadly methods of suppressing 
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internal dissent, such as massacres, deportations, and forced population exchanges.62 
Hanioğlu argues that  
[t]he radicalism of Atatürk's program led to the authoritarian character of 
his politics. Like many other transformative state builders, he harbored 
little tolerance for dissent or criticism. He regarded the Republican 
People's Party as his main agent of reform and insisted on its hegemony. 
Like the CUP leaders who had abandoned democratic politics when it 
jeopardized their program, Mustafa Kemal resorted to single-party rule 
in order to execute his agenda without compromise. Since, in his eyes, 
the mission was historically preordained, all measures were permissible 
to assure its success.63 
 
In the introduction to their book on authoritarian modernization in Turkey and Iran, 
Atabaki and Zürcher discuss how the authoritarian tendencies of leaders like Mustafa 
Kemal stemmed in large part from the social, intellectual, and political environments in 
which they came to develop their views on change and modernization. Many of the 
Ottoman state's enlightened intelligentsia were exposed to European positivist and 
scientist writings, and attracted to the authoritarian ideologies of the political right. 
Works such as those of Gustave LeBon, which tended towards a deep mistrust of the 
'masses,' were highly popular among young military officers in the Balkans and Middle 
East. Convinced that the only means of instigating and pushing through the 
comprehensive reforms necessary for society to modernize was by way of a powerful 
and influential leader dominating the ruling institutions, many modernists at the time 
believed that “in a world divided amongst colonial powers, each intent on expanding its 
realm, any attempt of examining change and reform from below tended to undermine 
the country's integrity and sovereignty.”64 A perceived failure of earlier attempts to 
introduce modernization shaped the type of authoritarian modernization that was 
applied in post-World War I Turkey, and Mustafa Kemal's policies of centralizing state 
power and pushing through reform programs was “in a sense a reaction to this widely 
felt need for authoritarian reform.”65 After the tragic territorial losses, humiliating 
defeats, and disintegration suffered by the Ottoman empire after the Balkan War and 
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World War I, the intelligentsia and middle classes of the new republic looked for what 
Atabaki and Zürcher call  
a man of order, who, as agent of the nation, would install a centralised, 
powerful (though not necessarily despotic) government that would be 
capable of solving the country's growing problems of underdevelopment, 
while at the same time safeguarding its unity and sovereignty.66  
 
The way in which an abrupt severing of the new nation from the previous entity was 
carried out, and the justifications used to legitimize this, not surprisingly evoked 
reactions from Arab intellectuals who had been connected to and identified with this 
entity, not least by the now-marginalized script.  
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3.  “ATTACKING ISLAM:” THE TURKISH SCRIPT CHANGE IN AL-MANAR  
 
 
 
 
Early and sustained interest in and reaction to Turkish script reforms appear in al-Manar 
al-Islami, or the Islamic Beacon, which has been referred to as perhaps “the most 
influential of all intellectual forums in the Muslim world.”67One of the foremost 
publications subscribing to Islamic salafi reformist ideology, al-Manar was a journal 
that appeared in Cairo in 1898 through the personal initiative of prominent author and 
intellectual Muhammad Rashid Rida.68 Rida was born in Qalamun near Tripoli in 1865, 
and received his education first in the kuttab, or local Qur'anic school of Qalamun, later 
moving to an Ottoman state school and then the Madrasa Wataniyya in Tripoli. 
Influenced by his teacher, Shaykh Husayn al-Jisr, to “appreciate and fully accept the 
ideas” of scholars like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh, he was also 
schooled in modern sciences and French.69 
 
Although Rida spent time as a member of the mystic Naqshabandi order, during which 
he implemented extreme ascetic practices, he eventually participated in a session of the 
Mawlawis which he states caused him to doubt Sufism and consider it spiritually 
dangerous.70 His encounter with al-Afghani's and 'Abduh's journal, al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa, 
was a significant turning point for Rida, as the journal had a profound effect on him,71  
re-directing his thought and providing him with inspiration to view the reform of Islam 
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as the means to political independence.72 Rida wrote to al-Afghani with a request to 
come to Istanbul and study under him, but al-Afghani died in 1897 before he could join 
him.73 
 
Rida met with 'Abduh when the latter visited Tripoli in 1894, and in the winter of 1897-
8, Rida traveled to Cairo where he joined 'Abduh's modernist circle and became a 
devoted disciple. In 1898, he began the publication of the first issue of al-Manar, which 
was to be the organ of Islamic reform according to 'Abduh's ideas.74 Rida continued to 
publish al-Manar quite regularly until his death in 1935, after which the journal's last 
volume had its ten issues published over the course of six years.75 Although he wrote a 
number of other books, the journal became the primary means through which he 
continued the ideas of 'Abduh, and published his own thoughts on Islamic reform, 
reflections on spiritual life, responses to various news from around the Muslim world, 
accounts of his travels, and the Qur'anic commentary Tafsir al-Manar, started by 'Abduh 
and continued by Rida but never completed.76 The commentary was highly influential, 
and stood out for its pragmatism, as well the fact that it set “a precedent for discussing 
chapters as organic unities, in contrast to traditional atomistic exegesis,”77 further 
establishing him as a leading intellectual. 
 
In his introduction to the second edition of al-Manar's first volume, Rida describes the 
difficulties faced in getting the journal started. He had begun by printing and circulating 
1500 copies of each issue to prominent figures in Egypt and Syria, but most of the 
copies that had been sent to Egypt were returned to him, and the Ottoman state blocked 
those sent to Syria and other parts of the empire. Rida had then decreased printing to 
1000 copies per issue, but even after a couple of years, the number of subscribers still 
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had not increased beyond approximately 300.78 It was not until 1902 that the journal 
became more popular, and subscribers began to request copies of previous issues.79 
 
Even a basic reading of al-Manar indicates the extent to which Rida dedicated himself 
to the journal; as Hourani notes, “indeed, there is a sense in which, from the time of its 
foundation, the Manar was his life.”80 The issues of al-Manar chronicle the personal 
development of Rida and his attitudes, focuses, hopes, and disappointments over a 
period of almost forty years.81 Transitioning between reading the last issue he personally 
published to the issues published after his death, one profoundly senses an abrupt lack 
of his presence among the pages of the journal. But al-Manar's significance derives not 
only from its being an invaluable source on the life and thought of Rida himself; over 
the years, the issues reflected events of the Muslim world as viewed from Cairo. The 
articles by other authors that were chosen for publication in the journal provide us with 
an additional level of analysis, as they demonstrate which people and what modes of 
thinking the reformist circle in Cairo at the time deemed acceptable and relevant to the 
Islamist modernist agenda. Al-Manar thus becomes a useful source for exploring 
connections between the reformist movement and pan-Islamists like Shakib Arslan, 
Arab nationalism, Wahhabist propaganda, and European Orientalist scholarship on the 
Middle East. 
 
Publishing the first issue in early 1898, Rida hoped that al-Manar would be a means for 
furthering religious and social reform within the Islamic umma and “for those who 
coexist with it, those whose interests are intertwined with its own.” It would also serve 
to demonstrate the compatibility of Islam with science, knowledge, and human interests 
“in every country and era,” and would “refute whatever false claims are made against 
[Islam], whatever myths are attributed to it.”82 In his introduction to the first issue, Rida 
assured readers that his journal would spend time focusing on the education and good 
upbringing of girls and boys, not the criticism of princes and sultans, and would 
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encourage the pursuit of the arts and sciences, not opposition to the judiciary and the 
law.83 Over the years, al-Manar went on to feature articles on important political events, 
science and medicine, reviews of contemporary books and journals, and interviews with 
prominent European scholars, as well as answers to questions on religious matters that 
readers frequently sent in. 
 
Al-Manar was also concerned with literature and language, Rida wrote, and would work 
to promote the various merits of Arabic. For Rida, reviving Arabic studies was a 
priority, and he stressed the need to spread the Arabic language, rather than Turkish, 
because an understanding of Arabic was necessary for a clear understanding of Islam 
and its spread was a crucial step towards reviving the religion.84 However, even with its 
emphasis on Arabs and the necessity of Arab revival as a prerequisite to a broader 
Muslim awakening, al-Manar firmly identified itself in its early days as Ottoman; its 
source of nourishment was its Ottoman roots, and it spoke with a “Hamidian tone.”85 
And although it would tackle foreign and domestic political affairs with a fair and 
balanced perspective, not aligning itself with any political party, the journal declared 
that it would justly defend al-dawlah al-'aliyyah, or supreme state, “devotedly serving 
our Sovereign the Great Sultan.”86 A change in Rida's attitude towards the Ottoman 
entity in later issues of the journal becomes evident, especially during the period of the 
Young Turks towards whom he felt great disappointment and agitation. 
 
Rida startlingly breaks with the ideologies of al-Afghani and 'Abduh in his thoughts on 
economic life. Deeply aware that Islam was facing the threat of economic penetration 
and domination by Western capitalism, he argued that the Islamic principle of necessity 
could be invoked to legalize what would otherwise be forbidden, allowing Muslims to 
move beyond the traditional legal interpretation of the prohibition against taking 
interest, and build their economic systems on the same basis as the Western world.87 As 
part of its aim to explore the means of economic profit and to promote competition with 
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“civilized nations” in all things beneficial, al-Manar alerted the Ottoman state to the 
fact that financial companies, and not kings or princes, were the source of development 
and prosperity, and the reason for Europe’s advancements in the arts and industries, as 
these financial companies established libraries and schools, bolstered workshops and 
factories, and powered ships.88 Like his discussions on topics as diverse as women's 
rights, jihad, power and authority, and social morality, Rida's writings on economic life 
in al-Manar reflect a fundamental principle around which all of his thought was 
centered: “[t]he need to create a system of law which people could really obey in the 
modern world – which should therefore be law in the real sense, just as it should be 
Islamic in the real sense...”89 
 
Ultimately, the dominant theme expressed throughout Rida's work is what Wood 
identifies as “an overwhelming awareness of Muslim weakness relative to non-Muslim 
strength.”90 His writings in al-Manar over the years demonstrate his sobering 
realization that the Muslim world was falling behind the West in progress and 
modernization, which he explained was the result of Muslims' deviation from true 
Islam. For Rida, Islam was the only inherently perfect social system for all societies in 
all times, and he argued that a return to true shariah would serve to unite Muslims and 
bring about the restoration of the Muslim world's rightful glory. Like modernist 
reformers before him, he believed that Islam was completely compatible with scientific 
progress, and called for an important distinction between Muslims partaking in 
scientific development, and their falling victim to the domination of Western cultural 
values. As Badawi explains, the position of reformers like Rida “was in a sense a 
resistance to European cultural penetration, and in another it was a yielding to what was 
considered science and technology.”91   
 
As an influential and “very important work in the context of the modern Muslim 
awakening,”92 the insights al-Manar provides regarding the Kemalist reforms in Turkey, 
and specifically the language-related reforms, are extremely valuable to a study of Arab 
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perspectives on the Turkish alphabet change. The journal contains a wealth of articles 
on Arab-Turkish relations in general, and on the language policies of the Turkish 
republic, which are most often portrayed as hostile attacks on Islam. The authors 
selected for study in this thesis who published articles in al-Manar about the Turkish 
alphabet change highlight through their writings and their backgrounds the degree of 
interconnectedness between developments occurring in Turkey and concerned Arab 
observers who felt that such developments were immensely relevant to their own lives. 
Rashid Rida, 'Abd al-Hamid al-Rafi'i, and Shakib Arslan had all been born and raised as 
Ottoman subjects, receiving Ottoman educations and actively participating in Ottoman 
state affairs at various levels. All three of them were concerned with the issue of Islamic 
governance and the state of the Muslim umma, and were witness to the important role 
the Ottoman empire played as the major Muslim world power and the caliphate to the 
Muslim world. It comes as no surprise that these men were deeply connected to the state 
and involved in its activities, and continued to carefully follow its political and social 
developments as it eventually lost power and gave way to a new nation state under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal.  
 
Rida's early activism focused on bringing Turks and Arabs together as fellow Muslims 
within the framework of the Ottoman empire;93 in early 1907, he founded Jam'iyyat al-
Shura al-'Uthmaniyya in Cairo together with Rafiq al-'Azm with the goal of increasing 
co-operation among the different ethnic communities of the empire. As his 
dissatisfaction with the tyranny of Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid increased,94 he enthusiastically 
supported the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 that forced the sultan to restore the 
Ottoman constitution, although he later became disheartened with the Young Turks as 
well. As an advocate of social progress and reform, a constitutional regime in Istanbul 
and the granting of new rights had represented a triumph of the ideas he believed in.95 
During his 1909-10 stay in Istanbul, he worked to remove misunderstandings in the 
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Arab-Turkish relationship, and also attempted to establish a modern Islamic institute of 
higher education that would produce graduates who would be able to defend Islam 
“according to modern standards.”96 
 
Although Rida had initially been a supporter of the Ottoman caliphate as a legitimate 
source of authority over the Muslim umma and hoped that a program of Islamic reform 
and revival could be implemented under the auspices of the Ottoman state, his interest 
eventually turned to Mustafa Kemal, and he expressed great admiration of him due to a 
perception of the man's determination to stand up against European colonial aspirations 
and to preserve the dignity of Muslim nations everywhere. Writing in response to a 
letter from a reader asking whether Turks and other a'ājim97 should be considered true 
Muslims, Rida explains that not only might they be proving to be better Muslims than 
the Arabs were, but that it might even be appropriate to claim that if it were not for 
Mustafa Kemal, every Muslim on earth would have become degraded and servile.98  
 
For a while, the hope Rida held for the future of a strong Turkish state under Mustafa 
Kemal was so strong that he went as far as requesting that Muslims not react so harshly 
to what came as a severe shock to the Muslim world when the Kemalist regime reduced 
the position of caliph to a mere figurehead, insisting that Mustafa Kemal's actions 
should not be judged prematurely.99 As the issue quickly became the most hotly debated 
topic of the time among Muslim intellectuals, Rida argued that while the concept of a 
caliph as an overall leader of the Muslim umma was indeed an essential component of 
shariah, the popular understanding of what the position of caliph meant had morphed 
into something that was quite at odds with the true definition. Because no position of 
spiritual sovereign existed in Islam as it did in Christianity, the premise of a need for 
separation between religious and legal sovereignty was an unnecessary debate in the 
Muslim context. Rather, the position of caliph as outlined by shariah simply included 
both religious and temporal dimensions; a caliph's religious leadership conferred upon 
him certain privileges in matters of religious practice such as leading prayers or giving 
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Friday sermons, but this did not mean that Muslims were obligated to follow his 
opinions on doctrinal issues. His position as legal sovereign implied that his commands 
should be obeyed as any leader's commands would be, insofar as they did not constitute 
any form of sin. Because of this, 
we believe it is now in the best political interests of Muslims to support 
the Kemalist Turks in their stance against Europe which seeks to extort 
whatever remains of Muslim wealth and power, besides that which they 
had already extorted previously. [Muslims] should not let [the Turks'] 
mistake regarding the issue of the caliphate be a reason to undermine 
their position. Rather, we wait until...they are completely independent 
from the shackles of European influence to put forth our suggestions, as 
well as our legal and political reasoning, regarding the degree of 
authority and power the caliphate should wield...At this time, the leaders 
and 'ahl al-hall wal-'aqd100 in the Turkish state are the Grand National 
Assembly in Ankara; if they succeed, the state will be saved, and if they  
are betrayed and let down – God forbid - the state will perish!101? 
 
If only Muslims understood 'the truth' of the situation, Rida believed, they would not 
place so much emphasis on the Turkish attitude towards the caliphate, and would 
instead work to strengthen Turkey's position vis-a-vis Europe, putting aside their 
criticisms and suggestions on how to deal with the question of the caliph for later: 
We request that Muslims show compassion for the new Turkish state and 
support it as steadfastly as we used to support the sublime Ottoman state. 
In doing so, we do not see it necessary to deviate from any of our 
religion's principles, nor to wholly endorse the soundness of all 
[Turkey's] actions, since we are supporting it in its resistance to those 
who are attacking both it and us...102 
 
As time passed, however, Rida began to worry that the new Turkish regime was perhaps 
not so keen on retaining shariah as the basis for the state's legal, political, or even social 
structure. His alarm at Mustafa Kemal's apparent lack of concern with reevaluating the 
position of the caliph is clearly voiced in his translation of and commentary on a speech 
given by Mustafa Kemal during a session of the GNA in early November of 1922 in 
which it formally abolished the sultanate and stripped the position of caliph of any real 
authority. Rida indignantly opposed the decision regarding the caliphate, deeming 
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Mustafa Kemal's justification for it completely contradictory to the principles of shariah 
and the proper Islamic conception of a caliph. He wrote:  
I say this as a faithful adviser to this force, supporting it in its resistance 
of the enemies of Muslims, and I was the first to oppose the attempts to 
make the Sharif of Mecca – who defected from the state and pledged 
allegiance to its enemies – the caliph of the Muslims; I endorsed the 
Kemalists' actions, preferring them over [the Sharif] and his children. 
But I do not say except that which I believe is the truth, that Ghazi 
Mustafa Kamal Pasha is mistaken in trying to prove in his speech that the 
caliphate system is invalid and ill-suited to achieving the well-being of 
the ummah...103 
 
Yet despite his evident concern at Mustafa Kemal's disappointing stance and the turn 
events were taking, Rida remained hopeful that the leader would respond positively to 
the recommendations he had personally sent him regarding how to best resurrect and 
utilize the position of caliph. He also called on the Turkish regime as a whole to correct 
what he saw as an extremely faulty decision, and advised them to consult with various 
Islamic scholars from across the Muslim world on how to alter the situation.104 At this 
point, Rida still viewed the Turkish position on the caliphate as simply the regime's lack 
of understanding of the importance of the issue from an Islamic perspective, and 
genuinely believed that proper counsel and clarification would change their stance.105 
 
By 1923, Rida's concern was turning into increasing dismay as it became clearer that the 
new Turkish regime was actively working to eliminate Islam's influence in all legal and 
public domains of its new state. In an essay on the principles of shariah and an Islamic 
caliphate, Rida accuses Mustafa Kemal of inventing Islamic legal justifications to allow 
for a variety of matters that were explicitly forbidden by all four of the major Islamic 
schools of thought. For example, he presents readers with an instance in which Mustafa 
Kemal created his own fatwa allowing for the traditionally-prohibited construction of 
statues and monuments, claiming that the prohibition was no longer valid in modern 
times where this was a necessary form of art. Rida additionally cites the example of 
Mustafa Kemal justifying “the intermingling of women and men” as well as many other 
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issues that “would not please religious scholars and practicing people.”106 While Rida 
acknowledges that Mustafa Kemal is “clever and articulate,” he maintains that it is 
wrong of him to use his political power to give opinions on religious matters without 
being a scholar or jurist.107 Additionally, he warns Turkey against blindly imitating the 
West, urging it to turn to authentic scholars to ensure that its leadership and society do 
not stray from the perfect system embodied in the shariah.  
 
3.1. Rashid Rida On the Turkish Alphabet Change 
 
 
The official abolition of the caliphate in 1924 was clear indication for Rida that Mustafa 
Kemal had no intention of rectifying the position of the caliph, nor of consolidating a 
Muslim nation along the Ottoman model. The hopeful tone that had echoed throughout 
his previous writings expressing his optimism for the prospect that the new Turkish state 
would restore the Muslim umma's glory changes to both resignation and disapproval. 
This disapproval extended to the Turkish alphabet change, illustrated not only in Rida's 
own opinions voiced throughout his essays in al-Manar, but also in his publication of 
various guest articles by other opponents of the change, such as 'Abd al-Hamid al-Rafi'i 
and Shakib Arslan, which will be discussed in the following section. 
 
As early as 1925, Rida was predicting with great certainty that the Turkish regime 
would sooner or later implement an alphabet change, as a continuation of the “Turanian 
efforts” to rid Turkish society of any semblance of Arabic influence in their grand 
scheme of separating Turks from Islam.108 According to Rida, these “extremist 
nationalist Turkish” ideologies started to gain prominence around 1909, and had 
practical implications in the form of the colonization and Turkification of the Ottoman 
Arab territories, the purging of Arabic and Persian words from Turkish,109 and the 
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translation of the Qur'an into Turkish - an act which Rida saw as a way for the Turkish 
regime to alter the book's content and meaning according to its own interests.110  
They want to erase everything that is Arabic from the Turkish language 
and from the souls of the Turkish people. They even created a special 
society to, as they call it, “purify the Turkish language” from Arabic. 
Some of them suggested writing their language with Latin letters, and if 
atheism continues to have sway over this Muslim nation for much longer, 
they will certainly implement [the alphabet] change just as they 
implemented others, like replacing the [revealed] Qur'an with a Turkish 
Qur'an.111  
 
For Rida, the importance of Arabic lay solely in its position as “the language of Islam” 
and therefore in its power to unite Muslims from diverse backgrounds, as they all 
recited, memorized, and worshiped with the same text in the same language.112 Because 
of the clear religious and symbolic significance of Arabic and its written form, the 
measures taken to alter the Turkish language's association with Arabic and the 
suggestions to change the Arabic-based script could only be interpreted as part of a clear 
attempt by the regime to completely reshape the identity of Turkish society. 
Overhauling the education system to exclude classes on religion, dictating Western 
attire, translating the Qur'an, and purging the language from Arabic influence all aimed 
at achieving one goal: definitively identifying Turkey as a European, Western country 
with no ties to Islam or the East.113 Anticipating an alphabet change early on, Rida 
exclaims:  
They now want to do to [the language] what they are doing to its 
speakers; what will remain of the language of the ancient Turks after it 
becomes Europeanized and Westernized, written with a Latin script as 
will inevitably happen very soon? For all we know, they might even 
change its name too!114 
 
Rida saw the eventual alphabet change not as unique to the Kemalist reform project, but 
as the fulfillment of a Westernization policy that extended back to the Young Turks and 
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early Turkish nationalists.115 Discounting any arguments that a script change may have 
been useful for increasing literacy rates across Turkey, Rida attacked the author of an 
article published in Majallat al-Rabita al-Sharqiya who had praised the positive effects 
the alphabet change had on Turkish literacy by claiming that “this latest scientific 
revolution in Turkey is unequaled in the history of mankind,” and by glorifying Mustafa 
Kemal as a great teacher presiding over a school that comprised his entire nation. “Does 
this writer, who has become crazed with Kemalist propaganda and who has glorified 
that which is not great, believe that all people are similarly crazy, and would 
submissively accept such insane testimony...?”116 He later accused that journal of 
blasphemy and of propagating ideas that intended to “weaken faith and undermine 
Islam's linguistic and social connections;” among them “the exchange of Arabic letters 
for Latin letters.”117   
 
In his introduction to the thirtieth issue of the al-Manar, Rida reminds readers of the 
many grave dangers facing the Muslim world, stating that the “campaign against Islam” 
had become increasingly severe.  
We label as heretic anyone who praises the plan of those Kemalists to 
expunge the Islamic shariah in its entirety from their government and 
facilitate the erasure of Islamic beliefs...from the roots of their society by 
prohibiting the use of Arabic in their country, translating the Qur'an with 
Turkish terms that cannot do its true meanings justice, and writing it and 
everything else in Latin letters. Anyone who calls this plan a reform, 
commends it, or invites support for it is an enemy of Islam...118 
 
Throughout the issues of al-Manar over the years, Rida repeatedly emphasizes the 
theme that the Turkish alphabet switch was not a benign reform aimed at streamlining 
the writing system or improving education and literacy levels among the Turks, but part 
of an aggressive anti-Islam campaign. Responding to a letter sent in by a reader from 
Java in 1930 asking for al-Manar's clarification on why the Kemalist regime adopted a 
Latin script and what implications this might have for the future of the Javanese Arabic 
script, Rida is quick to clarify:  
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The author of this letter...should not think that the Kemalist Turks 
preferred to adopt Latin letters over Arabic as a script for their language 
because of the ease it brings to education. We have clarified in al-Manar 
that the reason for this preference is to distance their people from the 
religion of Islam and to cut all ties that used to connect them to it, 
regardless of other harmful effects that may occur as a result, such as 
wasting their scholars and learned people's efforts at refining this 
language and employing it to numerous compilations in all the modern 
arts and sciences over a period of eighty years, or burying the many logs 
and registers that preserve their political, social, and military history. 
They are futilely trying to create a new atheist nation...that has no 
relationship to the past except for the term “Turk.” The Latin letters do 
not accurately express their language; they do not do it justice nor do 
they ease the learning of it.119  
 
In a later issue, he claims that Turkish in its original form is one of the most limited of 
all known languages, relying in great part on Persian and Arabic loanwords. For this 
reason, writing the language with a Latin script confuses speakers and makes it difficult 
for them to identify the correct roots of words and in turn, their original meanings: 
It has been proven that their writing of Turkish with Latin letters has 
weakened it and halted the spread of sciences and arts in this language. 
What they may have gained in regulating pronunciation, they have lost 
many times over with a lack of comprehension and a decrease in the 
spread of knowledge.120 
 
It is important to note that Rida frames the alphabet change as something that was 
forced onto the Turkish public from top-down, against its will. He explains that 
although the public disapproved of such a change, Turkish society at the time was too 
weak to take concrete action against the Kemalist program of reforms. Rida held on to a 
desperate faith that the Turkish nation would remain patient, waiting for its opportunity 
to purge society of the dangerous deviations from the religion imposed by its 
government, and to return to the path of true Islam.121 Elaborating on this belief, he 
describes how the new Turkish state 
declared heresy and did away with shariah behind [the Ottoman state's] 
back. It abolished its courts, schools, and endowments; forced its citizens 
to give up their language, which was Arabic, and write the Turkish 
language using Latin letters; it rendered the Glorious Qur'an as a Turkish 
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translation that no Muslim can trust and wrote it with a Latin script, 
paving the way for it to eventually become obliterated from Turkish 
lands. The Turkish nation, the vast majority of which are Muslims and in 
which atheism is like a black spot on a white bull, could not prevent its 
dominating military government from this heresy, as it was weakened by 
poverty and long wars that had drained all its strength. It tried multiple 
times to assassinate the president of its Laicist Republic but failed, and 
now awaits relief from Allah in the form of another coup.122  
 
 
3.2. 'Abd al-Hamid al-Rafi’i: “The Danger of the Kemalist Attack On Islam: 
Replacing Arabic Letters With Latin Letters and the Necessity of Fighting this 
Threat to the Islamic World”  
 
 
One of the contributing authors featured in al-Manar was 'Abd al-Hamid al-Rafi'i, 
prominent author and poet from Syria who famously came to be known as the 
'Nightingale of Syria.' Born in 1859 in Ottoman Tarablus al-Sham, al-Rafi'i was  
initially educated at al-Azhar, then later in Istanbul. He held various positions under the 
Ottoman state, including that of kaymakam of Nazareth. Exiled to Medina during World 
War I, he eventually returned to Tarablus, where he died in 1932.123 Like Rashid Rida, 
al-Rafi'i had spent a significant part of his life as an Ottoman citizen, receiving an 
Ottoman education and actively participating in the empire's affairs at the state level. 
This background provided an important motivation for his continued interest in Turkey 
even after the end of the Ottoman era, and he perceived events occurring in Turkey as 
having profound implications for the larger Muslim umma, especially its youth.  
 
Al-Rafi'i's 1928 essay in al-Manar regarding the Turkish script change, titled “Khatar 
Hujum al-Kamaliyyin 'ala al-Islam, 'Istibdal al-Ahruf al-Latiniyya bil-Huruf al-
'Arabiyya: Wujub Muharabat hatha al-Khatar 'ala al-'Alam al-Islami” (The Danger of the 
Kemalist Attack On Islam: Replacing Arabic Letters With Latin Letters and the 
Necessity of Fighting this Threat to the Islamic World), expresses great alarm at what he 
regards as an “explicit attack” by the Kemalists in Ankara who were using “diabolical 
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methods” to “erase Islam from the world.” Al-Rafi’i addresses his message to Muslim 
youth generally and Arab youth specifically, arguing that protecting their religion and 
preserving the interests of future generations had become a holy obligation upon them. 
Al-Rafi’i believed that “the enemies of Islam in Ankara” had resorted to funding 
European intellectuals to spread propaganda that painted a picture of positive reform 
and development in Turkey while supporting the Kemalists’ aims to destroy Islam. He 
cites, for example, academic lectures by scholars such as Louis Massignon, then chair 
of Collège de France, in which efforts were made to convince “Eastern students in 
Europe” of the merits of replacing Arabic letters with Latin, which would serve to 
completely eradicate the Qur'an in accordance with the Kemalist plan.124 
 
According to al-Rafi’i, further evidence for Kemalist manipulation of European 
scholarship was an article published in Journal de Geneve and authored by whom he 
refers to simply as “the Swiss author M.J.” He quotes the article extensively, arguing 
that the Swiss author furthers the propaganda that the Kemalists have instructed him in 
with his claims that the most important reform undertaken by Mustafa Kemal was 
changing the Turkish people’s mindset to reject Islam, “cleansing them” of the religion’s 
“archaic beliefs that do not suit the modern era.”125 Al-Rafi’i’s emphasis in the first part 
of his essay is on the notion that the Kemalists had a cunning ability to control the 
production and dissemination of information in Europe. He insists that the anti-Islamic 
ideas that were being proliferated by European authors and academics were not actually 
these people’s own, but were “dictated” to them by the Kemalists. In funding the 
publication and propagation of anti-Islamic works and lectures in Europe, al-Rafi’i 
believed that the Kemalist manipulators had gone so far as to surpass any previous 
attempts by missionaries to undermine Islam.126 
 
Al-Rafi’i was also extremely perturbed by a number of people in Egypt who he claimed  
were willing to “sell their consciences” in order to spread an undeserved admiration for 
Mustafa Kemal “among the public in Cairo and Alexandria.” They achieved this by 
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falsely claiming that Mustafa Kemal was in fact so concerned about protecting Islam 
that he was employing a shrewd cover of working against the religion to fool Europe 
into giving him control of the Muslim lands it had occupied. After gaining control, they 
argued, Mustafa Kemal was sure to immediately grant these lands their 
independence.127 For al-Rafi’i, there could be no mindset “more dangerous than the 
mindset of these [Kemalist] advocates,” and “no degradation to Egyptians worse than 
this.”128 
 
At this point in his essay, the author carefully makes a distinction between “the 
Kemalists’” plan to undermine the Qur'an and the Arabic language “under Bolshevik 
instruction,” and “our Turkish brothers who have not fallen under the Kemalist 
influence, and who are just as pained as we are at the situation that has come to be in 
Turkey,” asking these brothers to forgive his harsh writings as an inevitable defense of 
the religion and the language.129 A new theme is abruptly incorporated here, shifting the 
blame for an attack against Islam and Arabic to communism. The focus is no longer on 
an ultimate Kemalist plot that extends beyond the borders of Turkey itself, manipulating 
events and the production of knowledge in Europe, but on the Bolsheviks as the source 
of a campaign against all religions. Just as Europe with its “organized churches, strong 
nations, and armed governments” united against the Bolsheviks to defend Christianity, 
al-Rafi’i argues, so too “must we stand up to the danger of the Kemalists, who have 
been led along by the ‘red Russians.’” Al Rafi’i now describes not simply a Kemalist 
danger to the Islamic world, but a “red Kemalist campaign” that rests on two 
fundamental claims: first, that Islam is not suitable for the Turks’ new life, and second, 
that the Arabic language with its Arabic letters is a symbol representing the 
degeneration of “the Turkish component,” and the true obstacle standing in the way of 
the Turks' development.130 After briefly addressing the first claim by posing a question 
to Mustafa Kemal as to the value that a Turkish existence ever claimed in history before 
being honored with Islam, al-Rafi’i moves on to addressing the second claim and main 
topic of his essay, the issue of the Arabic script and the Turkish alphabet reform.  
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His tone becoming increasingly sarcastic, al-Rafi’i calls on his readers to join the 
Kemalists “under the shining rays of the sun” and together delve into the question of the 
Arabic alphabet “which [the Kemalists] claim was a cause for the retardation of their 
imagined civilization.”131 In a rather extreme display of the interconnectedness of 
language and identity, al-Rafi’i argues that the essence of the issue of script change is 
truly only about civilizations and their place in history, and not about practical reforms 
or educational motivations. He dismisses these points, dedicating minimal space to 
refuting the ‘practical’ aspects of adopting a Latin alphabet, including that script's 
potential for easing reading and drastically increasing national literacy rates in Turkey.  
Failing to differentiate between Arabic script, Ottoman language, Turkish language, and 
Arabic language, he instead focuses the rest of his article on evaluating the relationship 
between the Arabic language and a particular civilization’s value. At the heart of al-
Rafi’i’s concern about Mustafa Kemal’s alphabet reforms is not a question of 
practicality or feasibility, but of the symbolic and tangible worth that the Arabic 
language brought to Turkish civilization, and what abandoning the Arabic script meant 
not only for Muslims in Turkey, but for the larger Muslim umma as well.  
 
First, al-Rafi’i firmly denies the existence of a true Turkish language132 - except for 
what he refers to as ancient “gibberish” that archeologists have only recently been able 
to interpret - and in turn, the existence of a purely Turkish civilization. “This is the 
greatest historical evidence that Turkish civilization did not exist,” argues al-Rafi’i, “for 
if it had, it would possess books or ancient inscriptions like those of the Egyptian 
civilization.”133 He further explains that the language used by Turks of his time, “and 
which is considered to be the most beautiful of the Eastern languages,” is in fact 
Ottoman, which al-Rafi’i also states was developed “around a century ago” by a group 
of Turkish, Circassian, Albanian, and Arab Ottoman scholars, and which was comprised 
mostly of Arabic and Persian, but included Turkish and European words. He posits that 
any scholarly achievements in science or literature that Turks of his day might claim for 
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themselves today were in fact a product of an Ottoman linguistic community, which 
itself derived all value from its drawing to a large extent on Arabic vocabulary and 
forms: 
[I]f you know that there is no such thing as a Turkish language today, and 
that the language whose Arabic letters they are replacing with Latin not 
only draws upon Arabic but claims it as its life source; and that before 
the creation of an Ottoman language - which derives its life, literature, 
and sciences from the Arabic language - the science and literature that 
the Turks boast of never existed; after knowing all of this, you can 
determine the magnitude of the Kemalists’ arrogance and their audacity 
to lie about science, history, and all of truth...134 
 
Al-Rafi'i's attempt to completely deny any legitimacy to claims of Turkish greatness 
outside of the Turks' connection with Islam appears extreme, but is not unique. Broader 
parallels to his style of discourse can be located in Western historical scholarship on 
Turks and the Middle East, specifically in many Byzantinist works that take a similar 
approach of denying the existence of any real Turkish civilization, in this case, outside 
of Byzantine influence.135 Writing in the early 1930s, renowned historian and “the 
'founding father' of modern-style Turkish studies”136 Mehmet Fuat Köprülü was greatly 
concerned with what he identified as “the prejudices that [European historians] have 
maintained about the Turks,”137 which he believed caused them to undertake biased 
studies of Turkish history and arrive at erroneous conclusions on the subject.138 Citing 
works by many eminent Byzantinists, including Rambaud, Diehl, and Nöldeke, Köprülü 
sought to refute the intellectual hostility and problematic perceptions of these scholars, 
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such as the notion that “the historic role of the Turks was military and destructive,” or 
that the Turks “had no positive role in civilized life.”139 Most prominent among these 
faulty notions was the Byzantinist tendency to portray the Ottoman empire as a mere 
“Islamized continuation of Byzantium,”140 and to attribute any value of the empire to its 
reliance on Byzantine traditions and institutions.   
 
Al-Rafi'i's strong denial of pre-Islamic Turkish civilization, while, as demonstrated, was 
not unique, indicates how fiercely connected his own identity was with language and his 
deep concern with the shifting power dynamics he saw taking place around him, as it 
became ever more clear that Muslims no longer represented a force with which to be 
reckoned, falling further and further behind European progress and development. 
Replacing Arabic letters with a Latin alphabet in a state that was once the center of 
Islamic civilization and power was yet another step in what people like al-Rafi’i 
perceived to be an increasingly threatening change to the status of the broader Muslim 
world. The major entity that once represented Muslim dominance, first in the form of a 
world empire and then as a Muslim nation state that had been able to triumph in the face 
of European colonialism, was now clearly distancing itself from its Islamic heritage, 
severing its ties with the rest of the Muslim world, and completely redefining its identity 
as a Muslim society. For al-Rafi’i and others like him, the Turkish alphabet reform was 
powerfully symbolic, representing how Mustafa Kemal and his new regime were no 
longer determining their nation’s value and status by its connection to Islam and the 
Arabic language, but rather in its ability to be as European as possible. This carried with 
it the implication that Islam itself was no longer something valuable, or something 
which powerful nations would proudly desire to adhere to. It also carried the 
implication that there was no value in being Muslim or a member of a Muslim 
community. This, then, was the “attack” on Islam that al-Rafi'i feared most. 
 
Al-Rafi'i identified the danger of the script change in Turkey, and the attack on Islam 
that it constituted, as being in the widespread effects that this reevaluation of Islam’s 
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role in the identity of a new nation state might have on youth throughout the rest of the 
Muslim world - effects that he argues had already started to affect places like Iran and 
Afghanistan, where he claims Turkish atheism and blasphemy had spread and taken 
root.141 Responding to what he perceived to be a genuinely dangerous threat to Islam, he 
attempted to reestablish the source of a society’s civilizational value in its connection 
with Islam, the Arabic language, and the Arabs:  
In sum, the Arabic language was for the Turks and other nations that 
entered the fold of Islamic civilization the language of thought, just as 
Latin was for Western nations in the middle ages...Turkish, then, was 
never a language of thought, and it never had an intellectual or literary 
heritage that would make it attractive to learn even if it were written in 
Latin...142 
 
Al-Rafi'i believed that Turkish could be described as nothing more than a primitive form 
of communication used among Turkic tribes, only becoming a proper language after 
these tribes embraced Islam and absorbed the necessary expressions, vocabulary, and 
rhetoric from Arabic to make it worthy of being deemed an actual language. In his view, 
Arabic so impressed Turkish society during its era of prosperity post-conversion to 
Islam that the Turks used it as the language of literature and science.143 Value could be 
attributed to the Turks and their language only insofar as they maintained a connection 
to Islam and Arabic; “without Islam and Arabic, they would have been nothing more 
than destructive, warring, blood-thirsty savage clans.”144 
 
In response to the Kemalist regime's attempts to identify Islam and the Muslim world as 
undesirable and backward, and striving to distance itself from them as much as possible, 
al-Rafi'i retorted by employing a re-distancing of his own. Countering by placing the 
label of undesirability squarely on the shoulders of the Kemalists, he portrayed them as 
dishonest, disillusioned about their own historical legacy, and unfaithful to history. 
Horrified at the Kemalists' arrogance in denying the significance of the Arabic language 
as a means of connecting the Turks and Arabs, al-Rafi'i exclaimed:  
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Look, ya ra'āk Allah,145 at this arrogance and ingratitude! Look at the 
extent of the audacity in disregarding the history of one of the most 
magnificent capitals of Islam and Arabic, in denying the great benefits 
that the Turks gained from being connected to the Arabs all those years, 
without which the Turks would not have had an existence worth 
mentioning.146 
 
He maintained the belief that switching to the use of a Latin alphabet would bring 
nothing positive to Turkey anyway; it would neither add to Turkey's heritage nor create 
brilliant new minds out of a society that had relied on Arabic-based thought throughout 
its best days.147 Al-Rafi'i also reassures readers that any overt European support for the 
Kemalist program that might exist could be explained as a result of funding by 
“Ankara's gold.” The truth was, that with their actual knowledge of Islam and Arabic 
civilization as well as an awareness of how the ignorance of Turkish governance led to 
the colonization and enslavement of Muslim dominions, thousands of European 
scholars mocked the Kemalists and their reforms. 
 
The culmination of al-Rafi'i's re-distancing lies in his call for all Muslims who were 
concerned about the attack on their religion to “stand up in the face of the Kemalists to 
defend Islam before their tide of blasphemy drowns the entire Muslim world.”148 
Although throughout his essay he shifts back and forth between blaming the Kemalists 
and the Bolsheviks for the devious plans to destroy the Muslim umma and its status 
among nations, al-Rafi'i eventually concludes by positioning the Kemalists, under the 
influence of Bolshevism, as the targets of a necessary jihad: “whoever has the ability to 
partake in jihad to kill this evil spirit that Bolshevism has thrust onto Ankara, and does 
not do so, his heart is surely sinful...”149 
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3.3. Shakib Arslan: “The History of Scripts and Arabic's Position” 
 
  
Another Arab intellectual whose views were spread to a wide audience through al-
Manar was Shakib Arslan. Born in 1869 to a family of Druze notables in Lebanon's 
Shuf region, Arslan was educated in Maronite and Ottoman secondary schools. His 
poetry, first published at the early age of seventeen, and his other literary pursuits 
earned him the title of Amir al-Bayan, or 'the prince of eloquence,' and he became a 
prominent intellectual and literary figure. In accordance with his status as a member of a 
family of powerful notables, he was also involved in politics, serving as kaymakam of 
Shuf in 1902 and then later again in 1908-11, and was elected a member of the Ottoman 
parliament in 1914.  
 
Arslan was a strong advocate for pan-Islamism and called on the Muslim umma to unite 
under the banner of common religion in order to reassert its position among the world's 
nations and regain its former glory. Frequenting the literary circles of Istanbul and 
Cairo, he was influenced by the ideas of al-Afghani and 'Abduh, and became a close 
friend of Rida, even writing a biography about him titled al-Sayyid Rashid Rida Aw 
'Ikha' 'Arba'in Sana (Mr. Rashid Rida, Or A Forty-Year Brotherhood). He worked 
relentlessly to support the preservation of the Ottoman empire, believing it to be the 
only means of preventing the umma from succumbing to European occupation. After the 
defeat of the Ottomans in the first world war and the imposition of the mandate system, 
Arslan was exiled to Switzerland where he served as the unofficial representative of the 
Syro-Palestinian delegation at the League of Nations. From Switzerland, he published a 
journal titled La Nation Arabe, through which he continued his campaign against 
European imperialism, as well as his call for Muslims to embrace their common Islamic 
heritage and unite in the face of Western occupation. Although of Druze origins, his 
work was firmly rooted in defending Sunni Islam, and he wrote prolifically on a variety 
of Islamic subjects. Like Rida, he believed in Islam as the crucial base for social order, 
and as such, disapproved of secularizing efforts like those of Mustafa Kemal's Turkish 
regime.150  
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In the June 1929 issue of al-Manar, the journal republished part of a study by Arslan on 
the history of written scripts, which had originally been published in al-'Ahd al-Jadid. 
The section of the study republished by al-Manar, titled “Tarikh Huruf al-Kitaba wa 
Makan al-'Arabiyya Minha,” does not actually include any reference to Turkey or the 
script change there. Whether or not the original piece draws attention to the Turkish 
case remains a question, but Rida makes sure to add his own introductory comments to 
the article to ensure that Arslan's work is properly framed in the minds of al-Manar's 
readers:  
Amir al-Bayan had written an article responding to some Westernizing 
Arab writers who had been deceived into favoring the imitation of the 
evils brought by the Kemalist Turks upon their own language, culture, 
schools, and journalism in continuation of what they had brought upon 
their religion and the morals of their people, and that is writing Turkish 
using Latin letters...151  
 
The study takes a modern 'scientific' approach to researching the origins of written 
language, using historical inquiry and drawing on opinions from experts in the field to 
identify ancient Arabic scripts from Yemen as the origin for later alphabets such as 
Phoenician and then Greek.  
The alif ba, or alphabet, was present in Yemen and the entire world two 
thousand years before Christ. The oldest Arabic script was found in 
Yemen and was called musnad, and the Phoenicians altered this script 
slightly. This is the opinion that was finally arrived at by researchers, as 
scholars previously used to believe that the Phoenicians had been the 
first of nations to use writing. Perhaps what caused Europe to attribute 
the invention of writing to the Phoenicians is the fact that the 
Phoenicians spread writing to Greece...Greeks know that writing came to 
them from the East, and they then spread it to the West.152 
 
Citing the opinions of Swiss and German linguistic scholars, Arsalan emphasizes the 
notion that Latin alphabets are completely insufficient for expressing Arabic. He also 
claims that current Arabic scripts like naskh are in fact most deserving of the label 
“modern,” as they maximize speed and efficiency by allowing the writer to quickly pen 
words in a form of connected shorthand. This type of shorthand script is “suitable [for] 
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nations that have reached the peak of modernity and are busy with numerous affairs and 
activities; it saves time and stationery.”153 
 
Contextualizing Arabic alphabets as historically significant and a source upon which 
Western nations eventually drew for their own forms of written expression provides a 
way for Arsalan to locate value in the Arabic script. It is interesting that he relies solely 
on European scholarship to lend credibility to his argument that the Arabic alphabet was 
a valuable part of the historical heritage of written scripts and continues to be 
completely compatible with modernity, as well as to the idea that Latin letters are 
inherently inferior for representing Arabic accurately.  
 
Arslan here makes no mention of the importance of Arabic as the language of Islam and 
the Qur'an, nor of its power to unite the Muslim umma. He locates the value of using 
Arabic script to write language, not in its religious significance, but in its superior 
linguistic qualities. His concern is with providing a historical and scientific basis for 
emphasizing the legitimacy of the Arabic script as a means for writing and printing, 
even in modernizing nations. The use of Arabic script was not in conflict with a modern 
identity. The inclusion of this excerpt from his study in al-Manar, with Rida's 
introductory comments, implies that Arslan's argument has relevance for and is directed 
at the Turkish case. Also, although the excerpt itself does not involve a connection 
between the Turkish alphabet change and a threat to Islam, its publication in al-Manar 
draws one.  
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4. ALPHABET REFORM AND ARABIZATION: THE JOURNAL OF THE 
ARABIC LANGUAGE ACADEMY OF DAMASCUS 
 
 
 
 
 
Given the centrality of the Arabic script to Muslims, interest shown in the Turkish 
alphabet reform by Muslim scholars may be predictable. However, the journal of the 
Arabic Language Academy in Damascus provides a particularly demonstrative example 
of the immediate interest Arab intellectuals who were not concerned with Islam had in 
the Turkish alphabet reforms, and how they perceived the significance of events in 
Turkey for language development in the Arab world. Language academies in the Arab 
world have played a major role in the process of language modernization from the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Their functions center around guarding Arabic 
against influence from local dialects and foreign languages, as well as adapting it to the 
requirements of modern times.154 Although the academies may differ in their 
approaches, all of them share a focus on classical language rather than spoken dialects, 
as well as “a strong faith in the role of universal literacy and of mass communications 
media in gradually bridging the gaps between the two forms of Arabic.”155  
 
Across the Arab world, the language academies work to develop and determine 
language programs, unify terminology used in different Arab countries, and create 
scientific and technical terms necessary for various disciplines and branches of 
government.156 This process usually involves reviewing lists of terms submitted to the 
academies by committees of experts and specialists. After extensive review, the terms 
go through approval by the general assemblies; the approved items are then published in 
the academies' official journals. A downside of this process, as Versteegh maintains, is 
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that it can often be complicated and drawn out, and approved items “may take years” to 
eventually make their way into dictionaries.157 Relatively newer language academies, 
such as those of Iraq and Jordan, may have played a less significant role in the 
modernization of Arabic, but they continue to make contributions nonetheless. For 
example, the focus of the Iraqi academy was on editing classical texts with the goal of 
preserving linguistic and literary heritage,158 while the Jordanian academy today works 
on the Arabization of education in the kingdom, and organizes conferences and 
symposiums on a variety of issues pertaining to Arabic.159  
 
Historically, the assemblies of the language academies and their official journals have 
been the sites of important debates on various issues pertaining to alphabet reform. For 
example, in January of 1944, 'Abd al-'Aziz Fahmi Pasha presented a proposal to the 
Cairo Academy arguing for the need to make Arabic writing easier, and calling for the 
adoption of a Latin-based script. The assembly discussed his proposal about a month 
later, and published its conclusions in the sixth volume of the Academy's journal:  
Everything that was discussed during this congress on how to simplify 
writing is to be printed and announced by the usual means, sent out to 
specialized organizations and spread to the public. The usūl committee 
will receive comments on this and will present its report at the next 
congress. It is requested of the government to provide a prize of one 
thousand junayhs for the best proposal on facilitating Arabic writing, 
with the condition that members of the congress are not eligible to 
participate in the contest.160  
 
Although in the end not much came of Fahmi's proposal, his paper along with other 
draft proposals and papers submitted to the Academy during the same year together 
caused an “uproar,” sparking intense debate and criticisms about reforming the Arabic 
script throughout the Arab world.161 The importance of the language academies' journals 
as forums for discussions on critical issues cannot be understated. Articles appearing in 
them underscore the relevance of the topics discussed to Arab intellectuals. 
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4.1 Faris al-Khuri: “Opinions and Thoughts: Replacing Arabic Letters with Latin 
Letters” 
 
Founded in Damascus in 1919 during the era of the Arab Kingdom of Syria, the Arabic 
Language Academy of Damascus, or Majma' al-Lugha al-'Arabiya bi-Dimashq, was 
modeled primarily after the L'Académie Française, and was the main body responsible 
for dealing with all matters pertaining to the Arabic language in the new Kingdom. 
Because Ottoman Turkish had been the official language of the state during the period 
of Ottoman rule, the Academy was established with the goal of spreading Arabic to the 
institutions of the new state as well as to various facets of the education system and 
daily life. The Academy held conferences and published works on diverse aspects of the 
Arabic language; its main periodical, the Journal of the Arabic Language Academy, 
published conference proceedings, book reviews, and articles tackling linguistic issues 
that arose at the time. The introduction to the first issue of the first volume of the journal 
elaborates on the aims of the publication:  
It is the custom of scientific academies in civilized countries to have 
their own journals, published at certain times, which include the writings 
of their members and reporters on the topics of sciences and different 
arts; proceedings of lectures that may be held at these academies from 
time to time; the latest thoughts and opinions in the world of science as 
well as various discoveries and inventions; and a summary of the 
academies' works or works-in-progress...We are of the opinion that our 
own Arab scientific academy is in need of such a journal, so we have 
published it in this form...162 
 
Issue seven in the ninth volume of the Academy's journal, published in July of 1929, 
includes an article titled “Ara' wa Afkar: Istibdal al-Huruf al-'Arabiyya bil Huruf al-
Latiniyya” (Opinions and Thoughts: Replacing Arabic Letters with Latin Letters), 
which demonstrates how the alphabet debates and reform in Turkey were deeply 
consequential for prominent Arab intellectuals, sparking discussions in the Arab world 
not only about the value of the developments for Turkey itself, but also about the 
current state of the Arabic script and the feasibility of applying to it similar kinds of 
reforms. The article, a reprint of a piece originally written by one of the Academy's 
members, Faris al-Khuri, and published in the Syrian press in 1928 as a response to a 
recommendation by French Orientalists to replace the Arabic script with a Latin one, 
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compares the applicability of a script change like that of the Turkish case to the Arab 
world. The article posits that the Turkish switch to the use of a Latin alphabet inspired 
much thought and debate in the broader Middle East about the need to reform the 
Arabic script, including the drastic suggestion that the Arabs follow the Turks in 
adopting Latin letters themselves. In response to these suggestions, al-Khuri seeks to lay 
out the various reasons for his belief that switching to a Latin alphabet would not be 
feasible in the Arab world.  
 
Al-Khuri expressly indicates that he does “not deny that Arabic writing is in need of 
some reform,” specifically with regards to the problems of printing harakāt, or short 
vowels, as well as the multiple forms each Arabic letter can take.163 Harakāt, 
traditionally placed above or below the letters, were extremely difficult to indicate in 
print, because a mold needed to be created for each letter along with each of the 
individual harakāt, requiring an excessive number of molds and great expense.164 To 
address this problem, al-Khuri suggests that the harakāt could be rendered as letter-like 
shapes which would then be inserted wherever necessary in-line with the text, rather 
than above or below it. Similarly, letters could be written such that their form would not 
have to be altered according to their location as beginning, middle, or ending letters in a 
word, thus making printing easier and more efficient with only 29 letter molds instead 
of the hundreds in use at the time.165 In fact, a few months later in the eleventh issue of 
the same volume of the journal, an article was published containing a proposal for a 
new scheme developed by Zuhayr al-Shihabi to depict the harakāt using letter shapes 
instead of the traditional markings above and below the text.166 In a commentary section 
on al-Shihabi's scheme, Academy's member 'Arif al-Nikdi further proposed a method of 
reshaping the Arabic letters such that a single form for each letter could be maintained 
regardless of its position in a word.167  
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But unlike the Turks, al-Khuri did not see the solution to the complications posed by the 
Arabic script in resorting to the use of a completely foreign alphabet. He firmly believed 
that switching to a Latin alphabet could not be feasible for Arabic the way it was for 
Turkish, due to major differences between the two languages “which make that which 
[the Turks] have chosen for themselves impossible for us [to adopt].”168 These 
differences, for example, included a lack of sufficient letters in the Latin alphabet to 
represent the variety of Arabic consonants. Although Ottoman had included these 
different written consonants, modern Turkish eliminated many of these distinctions by 
condensing multiple distinct Arabic letters into single sounds which were easily written 
with a single Latin letter. Furthermore, Arabic was not in need of the rich array of vowel 
sounds that a Latin script could offer.  
 
The article also argued that the Arabic script was more economic than other alphabets, 
able to express a wealth of ideas and detailed content using less space than Latin letters. 
In his analysis of al-Khafaji's discussion on the communicative features of Arabic, 
Suleiman refers to this aspect of the Arabic script as “communicative economy,” or the 
notion that “Arabic can do more with less.”169 Suleiman explains that those who 
attribute to Arabic a superior communicative economy relative to other languages point 
to translations in and out of Arabic as evidence, noting that “(1) an Arabic text tends to 
be shorter than its corresponding source text, and (2) a foreign target text tends to be 
longer than its Arabic source text.”170 
 
Another reason to prefer maintaining the Arabic script over switching to Latin letters 
was al-Khuri's belief in the Arabic script's quality of being significantly more 'readable' 
than Western scripts:  
The Arabic script is clearer because of the distances between its letters, 
which prevent one letter from being confused for another. It can be read 
in day or night, and in dim light without the help of glasses, and anyone 
with near or far-sightedness knows this; today, I read Arabic writing 
without difficulty, but have to use glasses to read Afranji writing. This is 
one advantage of Arabic letters that should not be minimized, as this 
itself is enough reason to prefer Arabic over any other [language], for 
                                                
168 Al-Khuri, 435. 
169 Suleiman, Arabic Language and National Identity, 45. 
170 Ibid. 
 53 
you look at an Afranji page and can barely make out one letter from the 
next without having to carefully peer at it and strain the eyesight. That, I 
believe, is the reason most Europeans have to use glasses even while in 
their youth, while readers of Arabic remain able to read it with the naked 
eye even while in their elderly years.171 
 
The script simply needed a few alterations to improve its printed and written form, he 
argued, and doing so would render the Arabic alphabet “free of faults and [completely] 
adequate.”172 To this end, the article calls upon Najib Bek Hawawini as well as other 
famous calligraphers and printing press owners to work on designing new reformed 
Arabic printing molds. This would “increase the splendor and beauty of Arabic writing, 
such that this language would remain exceptional in the beauty of its written form, just 
as it is exceptional in its eloquence and rhetoric.”173 
   
Regardless of whether or not al-Khuri's claims about the various superior characteristics 
of the Arabic script are factually true - assuming that linguistic superiority can even be a 
measurable trait - his arguments detailing the alphabet's exceptional attributes illustrate 
what Suleiman refers to as the “organic relationship” between a language and its 
speakers, “whereby the high prestige of the language” is believed to reflect “the 
unsurpassable qualities of the people.”174 Implicit in the belief of Arabic's superiority 
over other languages is the perception that as speakers of Arabic, the Arabs as a group 
inevitably possess distinguished qualities compared to other peoples. This implied value 
serves as an important basis for strongly identifying with the language and the group, 
and for being reluctant to move away from or alter that source of value.   
 
An even greater concern for al-Khuri than economic considerations and readibility was 
that adopting a Latin script would cut off not only the Arabs, but the entire world from a 
wealth of Arabic written works that formed an “invaluable treasure” of ancient 
civilization and culture. Future generations would no longer be able to read these works, 
and they could certainly not all be re-printed in the new script. Al-Khuri argues that 
by committing this grave mistake we would sever our ties with the past 
and destroy all bridges connecting us to it while not having anything to 
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replace it with. As for the Turks, they do not possess this priceless 
fortune, and in disconnecting their past from their present, they lose 
nothing.175  
 
The question of inherent value crops up again here with the assumption that any aspect 
of Turkish civilization that relied on anything other than an Arabic-based writing system 
was somehow void of any worth. For al-Khuri, Arabic as the superior language was 
clearly what bestowed any historical value upon the Turks as a civilization, and 
abandoning the Arabic alphabet for Latin was in turn what stripped them of that value as 
a modern nation. It is also important to note that the author draws on an Arabic cultural 
heritage as a source of legitimacy without even a mention of Islam and its emphasis on 
the importance of Arabic. Framing Arabic's civilizational and cultural significance 
within a flexible history by tracing its value back farther than its religious status in 
Islam, the article's message transcends any religious boundaries that might include or 
exclude various sections of its readers, focusing instead on the cultural continuity of the 
language as a marker of overall group identity for all Arabs. As Suleiman argues, “[i]t is 
this flexibility of the past which makes it suitable for the culling of group-identity 
symbols with the power to evoke and motivate,” and which “enables the community...to 
mobilize for the purpose of defending itself against externally generated challenges, 
while, at the same time, embracing change and projecting it as part of the inner fabric of 
this past in an almost seamless progression of history into the present and beyond.”176 
Regardless of their religious identities, all Arabs could appreciate their greater linguistic 
heritage and the historical value that this heritage imparted onto their present identity. 
As a factor binding all Arabs together, moving away from Arabic script in favor of 
another form of written expression would threaten the ties between Arabs of various 
nationalities:  “We Syrians have no right to sever the strong bonds that connect us to our 
brothers in Iraq, Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa.”177 
 
Clearly, the events surrounding the alphabet question in Turkey were of concern to Arab 
intellectuals, who, in general, not only commented on the consequences of script 
reforms for Turkey itself, but also on the applicability of such drastic measures to the 
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Arab world. Al-Khuri's article in the Academy's journal is a clear indication that for 
Arabs, developments within their Turkish neighbor mattered. The article also poignantly 
demonstrates how powerfully language is connected to identity; individuals can locate 
their perception of their own self-worth within their language, and particular versions of 
the past are often relied upon in the identity-construction process.178 Al-Khuri focuses 
much of his article on making claims that Arabic possesses inherently superior linguistic 
qualities, and as Suleiman maintains, “what is important here is not their factual truth or 
falsity but their rhetorical or symbolic value as assertions of ethnic distinctiveness and 
superiority.”179 Here, language's role “in underpinning these assertions indicates its 
capacity to be used as an attribute of national identity in the modern period.”180 In line 
with the Academy's mission of nationalistic Arabization, the article establishes Arabic's 
value not in its religious status but in its exquisite linguistic attributes and its cultural 
continuity predating Islam, helping to define what it means to be Arab outside the often 
prevalent religious context of the region, and providing diverse readers with a broad 
basis for identification with the al-Khuri's argument against adopting a Latin alphabet.   
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5. SCRIPTS AND THE MODERNIZATION PROJECT 
 
 
 
 
 
The replacement of the Arabic script with a Latin alphabet in Turkey was not always 
perceived negatively by Arab observers. The Turkish alphabet and language reforms 
acted as a source of inspiration for Arab reformers who located in Arabic the cause for 
the Arab world's inability to catch up with Western progress and modernity. Even 
prominent writers such as Taha Husayn, who had long been occupied with classical 
Arabic literature, voiced the dire need for language reform, as he believed a majority of 
Arabs, including Azharite scholars, were not capable of using their own language 
properly.181 As mentioned in the previous chapter, 'Abd al-'Aziz Fahmi and other 
intellectuals went as far as boldly proposing the adoption of Latin letters for writing 
Arabic to the Arabic Language Academy in Cairo during a 1944 session.  
 
The two Egyptian authors whose works are discussed in the following sections similarly 
found Mustafa Kemal's alphabet reform to be inspiring. Although they hail from 
different religious backgrounds and approach the question of the Turkish script change 
from different angles, both maintain a causal relationship between a nation's script and 
its ability to modernize. Identifying scripts as a crucial realm of change necessarily 
preceding other reforms on a nation's path towards modernization and civilized society, 
the authors' works indicate their belief in the significant role scripts play in the 
formulation of identity at both an individual and national level. 
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5.1. Kamal Ataturk by Muhammad Muhammad Tawfiq  
 
“To the man who created Turkey, awakened the East, and daunted the West;  
To the man of politics and war: Kamal Ataturk. 
From an Egyptian who sees in him the best example of a perfect mujāhid and statesman.”
182  
 
Published in 1936 by Dar al-Hilal, Muhammad Muhammad Tawfiq's book Kamal 
Ataturk gives a biographical account of Mustafa Kemal's life, starting with his 
childhood in Salonika in the 1880s. Drawing on numerous English, French, Ottoman, 
and Arabic sources, the author's self-proclaimed task is to be a “painter,” “painting a 
portrait of one of the great men of history.”183 The book itself is a subject of debate; on 
the one hand, it is often referenced as an essential and comprehensive Arabic source on 
the life of Mustafa Kemal, but is also denounced as a Western attempt to disseminate 
pro-European propaganda in the Arab world, not only for its unconditional praise of 
Mustafa Kemal and his westernization policies, but also due to certain associations 
about its publisher, Dar al-Hilal.  
 
The Dar al-Hilal publishing house was founded in Cairo in the early 1890s by the 
influential Lebanese Christian writer Jurji Zaydan, who, because of his Christian 
background and secular leanings, was often perceived with suspicion by conservative 
Muslim circles. For example, critiquing Zaydan's History of Egypt, Dr. Muhammad 
Sayyid al-Wakil accuses Zaydan of writing an inaccurate and twisted account of Islam's 
history under direct influence from Western media. Critics of his novels dealing with 
Islamic history, such as al-Hilwani, 'Ashmawi, and al-Mahass, denied him the right to 
write about Islamic history as a Christian, believing he would be inherently prejudiced 
against it and as such would produce false or negative versions of the past. Furthermore, 
Zaydan and his publications were viewed as part of a larger danger posed by Christian 
immigrants from Greater Syria to Egypt who dominated literary publishing and worked 
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to divide the Muslim umma.184 Sing notes that Rashid Rida counted Zaydan and Dar al-
Hilal's main publication, the al-Hilal journal, as being among “the enemies of Islam.”185 
As for Tawfiq's book, at the beginning of a paper titled “Kamal Ataturk wa Isqat al-
Khilafa al-Islamiyya” (Kamal Ataturk and the Overthrow of the Islamic Caliphate), 
Islamist thinker Anwar al-Jundi refers to it as yet another of many works published 
under the influence of the Western and Zionist propaganda machine. These works, 
according to al-Jundi, aimed to champion Mustafa Kemal and fully commend his 
westernization project in Turkey.  
 
Little detail about the background of Tawfiq himself is available except for his self-
identification in this book as Egyptian, as well as a brief reference to his Turkish origin 
in the book's introduction.186 Tawfiq had personal connections with prominent Turkish 
contemporaries, including Mehmet Akif, renowned author and member of parliament, 
whose support he acknowledges at the beginning of the book. Regardless of the political 
leanings of the publisher or author, the book in its entirety serves as a lavish 
commendation of the character, personality, and policies of Mustafa Kemal, praising 
every aspect of his personal and political life and depicting him as an exceptional 
thinker, writer, and leader. He begins the book with an animated description of Mustafa 
Kemal: 
What a man he is! 
Protruding cheek bones. A prominent forehead. Two thick, disheveled 
eyebrows. Two resplendent blue eyes, like the eyes of a wolf; beheld 
within them are magic, magnificence, guile, ruthlessness, and perfidy.  
Nerves of steel, an iron will; a soul of fire, at times, and of ice, at other 
times; a voice like poured lead, and a gaze distant yet near... 
For him, there is no difference between birth and death: a child is born 
and thrown into the midst of life, while a man dons a uniform and is 
thrown into the line of fire... 
He drives his people towards civilization as he drives them towards the 
battlefield, and in both, he is an unflinching mass of iron and ice. 
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The author's approval extends to Mustafa Kemal's decisions regarding the alphabet 
change as well. In his chapter “al-Thi'b wal-Subbura” (The Wolf and the Chalkboard), 
Tawfiq praises Mustafa Kemal's replacement of the Arabic alphabet with a Latin script, 
viewing it as part of the leader's determination to eliminate all foreign influences that 
were not a component of the “genuine” Turkish heritage. The Arabic letters were, 
according to Tawfiq, “shackles that restricted the Turks and filled their minds with what 
was not Turkish.”187 
 
Furthermore, the Arabic letters were complicated to read, could take many forms, and 
required of the reader an in-depth knowledge of the language for correct pronunciation. 
“Why should the Turkish tribe have to endure such complication from letters that are 
not part of the heritage of their Asian pastoral ancestors?”188 Most of the other Central 
Asian Turkic nations had already abandoned the Arabic script for Latin letters years 
earlier, and Tawfiq questions why Turkey should not follow suit.  
 
Over the course of the next few pages, Tawfiq vividly describes the long thought 
process and thorough research undertaken by Mustafa Kemal in order to determine the 
merits of replacing the Arabic alphabet, before finally announcing the script change to 
his people, teaching them the new letters during a gathering at the Dolmabahçe palace:  
[I]n a short speech, he announces the replacement of the Arabic letters 
with Latin, then stands in front of the chalkboard and begins to write the 
new letters in a clear, beautiful hand, pronouncing each letter's sound 
with a powerful, ringing voice.189 
 
A “writing lesson” that would have taken days with the old script now took a matter of 
minutes with the new, and Tawfiq paints a picture of great excitement spreading among 
the people as Mustafa Kemal traveled across the country, teaching them how to write 
with the Latin alphabet. According to the author, the culmination of Mustafa Kemal's 
efforts was the formal adoption of the Latin letters in place of Arabic with the 
November 1928 law, which resulted in a rapid increase from a literacy rate of “less than 
10%...to more than 90%.”190 Tawfiq joyfully explains that the passage of the law, 
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together with a systematic effort at ridding the language of Arabic and Persian 
loanwords, and with translating the Qur'an, the call to prayers, and Friday prayer 
sermons into Turkish, would return the language to “the era of the tribe,”191 an 
identification he apparently finds preferable to anything after that. 
 
“In a matter of a few years, everything had become Turkish!”and “the new Turkey had 
risen, young and alive, from the ashes of the extinct past,”192 Tawfiq exclaims, 
positioning the script change as the watershed event which brought with it a variety of 
other important reforms that allowed the country to reconstruct its identity based on the 
notion of a return to a pre-Islamic nomadic Turkic heritage. The practical advantages of 
adopting a Latin script only figure slightly for Tawfiq, in comparison to the script's 
crucial role as an identity-marker. In his own words, the Arabic script was “a semblance 
of a defunct era,”193 symbolizing a foreign Arab and Islamic civilization194 rather than a 
heritage that was truly “Turkish,” and harkening back to an age of antiquity and defeat. 
Adopting a Latin script was, on the one hand, a clear indication to the world about the 
direction the young Turkish republic aimed to pursue. But more importantly, it served 
first and foremost as a means of forcing the Turks themselves to re-evaluate their own 
position between “the East” and “the West;” it was a new point of reference, developed 
then transmitted to the public in the form of a top-down decree, from which to derive 
meaning and value for their national and cultural identity as citizens of a modern 
Turkish republic.  
 
A selective approach to the past is a main feature of Tawfiq's interpretation of the 
alphabet reform in Turkey. In determining “genuineness” - what is genuinely “Turkish” 
versus what is not – Tawfiq appropriates a pre-Islamic, pre-Ottoman “Turkic” past as a 
legitimate heritage for contemporary Turks to identify with, while adamantly 
condemning any semblance of an Islamic-Arab historical legacy as a foreign influence 
that needed to be completely eliminated from the image of the modern Turk. 
Throughout his book, he positions Mustafa Kemal as the benevolent yet firm chief of a 
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“tribe” of acquiescent followers, the sole decision-maker who alone determines the fate 
of his venerating people. He exclaims that “everything [in Turkey] happens like 
miracles; and not surprisingly, for the chief orders, and the tribe obeys!”195  
 
Interestingly, Tawfiq's glorification of dictatorship throughout the book, like his fixation 
on war, is especially highlighted in the book's introduction by Fahmi Abaza, where 
Mustafa Kemal is compared to Hitler and Mussolini and approvingly determined to be 
“the most severe in tyranny and the greatest in might.”196 Like many of his Turkish 
nationalist counterparts, Tawfiq's work is steeped in what Kieser calls an ethno-
nationalist rightist revolutionary ideology, characterized by the belief “in modern 
progress, in a nation defined ethnically, and in the necessity of using violence to achieve 
modernity.”197 The state, personified by Mustafa Kemal, is positioned by Tawfiq as 
having the right to absolute control over an obedient society. In Turkey, this redefining 
of the state occurred during what Bozarslan refers to as the “third Kemalism,” or 
Kemalism between 1930-38, a period which witnessed “an openly and self-consciously 
anti-liberal and anti-democratic regime.”198 Bozarslan explains that  
[t]he consolidation of the Fascist and Bolshevik experiences, carefully 
studied in Turkey, and the popularity – and later on, the victory – of 
Nazism, constituted without any doubt important elements explaining the 
Kemalist move towards the ambition of a total control of the society by 
the State. The fusion of the State and the single Party (1937) which 
marked the ultimate manifestation of this control also changed the status 
of the People. The People...became the bearer of the Nation's essence – 
but without being aware of it. The State's (i.e., the “Chief's”) conscious 
intervention was thus necessary in order to reveal this essence to its 
bearer.199 
The earlier Kemalist agendas of westernization and civilization were further 
strengthened with this state control, although the concept of civilization was turkified, 
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resulting in the redefinition of the Turks as a group whose original or essence 
civilization was in fact the bringer of civilization to others.200  
 
Although Tawfiq does not explicitly argue that the Turkish example of script reform is a 
model which the Arab world should follow, his writings on the matter send a clear 
message to Arab readership about what it means to be modern and civilized, and the 
means by which these qualities are to be achieved. For Tawfiq, a society's language is 
intrinsically connected to its degree of progress, and the state of its script acts as a clear 
marker of identity and group worth. 
 
 
 
5.2. Salama Musa's Modern Rhetoric and the Arabic Language 
 
 
Many of the themes featured in Tawfiq's discussions of the Turkish alphabet change are 
echoed throughout the work of another Egyptian author, Salama Musa, in a book he first 
published almost ten years after Tawfiq's, titled al-Balagha al-'Asriyya wal-Lugha al-
'Arabiyya (Modern Rhetoric and the Arabic Language), and initially published by what 
appears to be Musa's own publishing house. The book takes a similar stance to Tawfiq's 
work on the issue of Turkey's script reform, but applies the discourse more directly to 
the case of Egypt, addressing what Musa saw as an important relationship between the 
Arabic language and the overall backwardness of Egyptian society.  
 
Musa was an outspoken early proponent of socialism in Egypt, helping to establish the 
first Egyptian socialist party along with 'Ali al-'Anani.201 However, as Hourani notes, 
his socialist thought “derived less from Marx than from the 'advanced thought' of 
Edwardian England, from Shaw and Wells and through them from Ibsen, Nietzche, and 
Tolstoy.”202 Musa wrote a multitude of books on topics such as social reform, education, 
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and the position of women in society, and authored one of the first Arabic works on 
socialism, a monograph titled al-Ishtirakiyya. During the late 1920s and 30s, he was the 
initial publisher of the magazine al-Majalla al-Jadida, which became a major 
publication of the liberal cultural scene, focusing on politics and social reform. 
Contributors to the magazine wrote on an array of political and social problems, among 
them the need to establish democracy and a society educated in science, as well as the 
fight against imperialism and the economic inequality that it operates on.203   
 
Writing his al-Balagha al-'Asriyya wal-Lugha al-'Arabiyya in 1945, Musa saw in 
Turkey an enviable model for modernization and progress, whose success at adopting 
for itself a European character and outlook he hoped Egypt would be able to emulate. In 
tackling the question of language and script reform in Egypt over a decade after Turkey 
had officially changed its alphabet, he repeatedly cites Turkey as an illustrative example 
of how his suggested reforms could be implemented successfully. Musa believed the 
project of modernization in Egypt could not succeed as long as Egyptian society relied 
on a language that not only was “steeped in the desert ethos and the outdated value 
system this engenders,”204 but also whose script was functionally incapable of serving 
modern scientific thought. “This language,” argues Musa, “cannot satisfy an educated 
man in the present age, as it does not serve the nation nor develop it,”205 owing to its 
inability to keep up with modern scientific discourse in providing Arabic equivalents for 
modern objects and concepts,206 and its inadequacy at transcribing scientific 
terminologies due to its lack of vowels.207 Considering it a very brave task to speak out 
for the need to abolish the Arabic script and adopt a Latin alphabet instead, Musa asserts 
that Egypt could eventually come to occupy a position like Turkey's, if only Egyptians 
would take action regarding the immediate need for such drastic measures. Musa firmly 
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believed that switching to a Latin alphabet was the single crucial step that had allowed 
Turkey to “close the doors on its past, and open the doors to its future.”208 
 
Entirely ignoring the fact that the Arabic script historically served the development of 
science and scientific thought during the Islamic 'Golden Age,' where it proved a 
perfectly adequate means for the translation of Greek works and the interaction between 
various ancient scientific sources and contemporary Arab scientists, Musa argues that 
the Arabic script is completely incompatible with modern science: 
  
But can we study the sciences in our own language, such that a scientific 
culture would prevail side by side with industrialization or a scientific 
civilization? Yes, we can, but not with the current Arabic letters. The 
reason for this is that the European and American sciences – and there 
are no other sciences in the world – rely on deriving words from Latin 
and Greek to form terminology that can express scientific meanings. The 
forms of this terminology, based on derivation from these two languages, 
enlighten the learner, and ease comprehension, as a first glance at a 
word's form indicates [its meaning]. 
 
There is, of course, an effort to translate scientific terms into Arabic, but 
this is a wasted effort. It is like trying to swim across an ocean; we can 
swim on the shores of the Atlantic, but we cannot swim across it from the 
African to the American coast, and this is the concern with Arabic words. 
There are approximately fifty or sixty thousand words that we cannot 
possibly translate, meaning we cannot discover or invent Arabic words 
that express the meanings of these terms. I would even accuse anyone 
who attempts such a translation with inadvertently retarding our 
scientific revival. And this is what the [Egyptian] Arabic Language 
Academy is doing.209  
 
He also posited that a Latin script would be easier and require less time for people to 
learn compared to the Arabic script, although he does not provide any “scientific” or 
observational evidence to bolster these claims. 
 
An incompatibility with science, however, seems to be a superficial concern when 
compared with the deeper issue of the ways in which Musa believed adopting a Latin 
script would serve to transform Egypt's identity, and relegate it to the sphere of 
modernized, industrialized, and most importantly, European nations. He elaborates:  
                                                
208 Ibid, 139. 
209 Ibid, 157-158. 
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Let us look at some of the positive features of [adopting] a Latin script:  
1- Firstly, we come closer to achieving the unification of humanity. This 
script is the tool for reading and writing among those who are civilized 
and own the means of production, which in turn denotes science, power, 
and the future. Nations that want to move towards reform adopt this 
script, like Turkey did, and it is most probable that very soon, this script 
will prevail across the world. 
 
2- By adopting a Latin script, we remove the psychological barrier that is 
constructed by those two ominous words “East” and “West,” so that we 
can also live a modern life. Furthermore, this script will likely bring 
along with it many other reforms, such as economic equality of the 
sexes, scientific thinking, and a scientific mentality or psychology, etc... 
 
… 6- When we write with a Latin script, we find that learning European 
languages also becomes easier, which opens up horizons that are 
currently closed to us.210 
 
Here, the “the unification of humanity” clearly refers to the assimilation of European 
characteristics and ideals, as Musa locates value in those he considers “civilized” and 
forward-looking. Dismissing any significance that might be derived from Egypt's own 
unique position or historical legacy, Musa is solely concerned with “the future” and 
appropriating an identity that strips Egypt of its negative designation as “Eastern” to re-
establish it as modern. With Turkey the definitive example, Musa believed in an 
alphabet's quality of being the clear indication of a nation's standing; for him, switching 
to a Latin script in Egypt would become the defining event that would bring with it a 
flood of other important European-inspired reforms. This point is further emphasized 
with the assumption that Egyptians should be concerned with learning only European 
languages, ensuring that Egypt remained firmly connected with Europe, the source that 
would accord it value as it pursued the path of modernization and industrialization. “In 
short,” he sums up, “adopting the Latin script is a leap towards the future. But would the 
elements that benefit from holding onto the Arabic script and traditions accept this 
leap?”211  
 
                                                
210 Ibid, 140-141. 
211 Ibid, 141. 
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The sinister tone of Musa's question above is illustrative of the antagonistic attitude with 
which he approaches opposing viewpoints throughout his book. Over the course of the 
next few chapters, Musa accuses his critics and those who do not see the adoption of a 
Latin script as the ultimate solution to Egypt's development of having a hidden agenda 
to keep Egypt steeped in outdated ways of life, of being too ignorant to understand the 
situation in full, and too emotional and overwhelmed with a hatred of Latin letters, 
European colonialism, and modernity to recognize the need for a script change.212 He 
maintains that Egyptians will never be able to move forward as modern citizens of an 
industrialized nation as long as they refuse to give up antiquated traditions and 
mentalities associated with an obsolete, rural lifestyle; first and foremost among them, 
the Arabic script. 
When we moved from a rural to an urban setting and riding the tram, the 
train, the automobile, and even the airplane, we were required to be more 
energetic and to wear lighter clothing. We began wearing trousers, 
because they allow greater freedom of movement for the legs, and we 
left behind the robes (jalābïb) and caftans (qafātïn) that we used to wear 
in the villages... Most of us now admit to the advantages of European 
attire over our robes and caftans, because we live in cities, not in 
villages.  
 
This is also the case with Latin letters, which are the modern attire for 
modern thought, for scientific thought... Just as we have people who are 
still attached to the loose Eastern attire, because they prefer a life of 
complacency and have no need for energetic activity, we similarly have 
people who hate Latin letters, because they have never read a single book 
in their entire lives. They do not understand the meaning of scientific 
accuracy. They are...a burden on us, dragging down our progress.213  
 
He then continues, in a chapter titled “Our Imperative Need for Latin Letters:” 
 
[C]ivilized nations do not triumph over Eastern nations except through 
industry, and only industry. All [these nations'] mental decency, their 
freedoms for men and women, their sciences and arts; all of this is the 
result of industrialization...Do you know what steel is?...It is power in 
war, and civilization in peace. It is civilization, because it accords us the 
morals of the civilized, the morals of knowledge and logic. It is what will 
take us away from our agricultural, feudal morals, the morals of religion 
and tradition, and our backward focus on the past, to looking forward 
towards the future.214  
                                                
212 Ibid, 176. 
213 Ibid, 153-154. 
214 Ibid, 155. 
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In fact, Musa only deviates from a discourse that is overtly averse to the past215 when he 
uses particular historical examples to justify replacing the Arabic script with a Latin 
one, claiming that “there is no shame [in changing scripts], as Egypt adopted the Greek 
alphabet two thousand years ago in place of hieroglyphics, and Europe adopted Arabic 
numerals in place of Latin numerals, while the Arabs adopted Indian numerals in place 
of Arabic numerals...”216 Only by following these successful examples and switching to 
a Latin alphabet would Egyptians be able to foster a scientific culture that drives and 
guides industrialization.217 He insists that adopting a Latin script would transport the 
nation a thousand years forward, requiring after that only a couple of years for Egypt to 
completely “cross the bridge between the Middle Ages and the Modern Age.”218 
Questioning what he refers to as blind and senseless attachment to the Arabic letters, he 
calls on his nation to bravely take action and adopt a Latin script, “acquiring, as a result, 
a scientific culture that elevates us with its broad horizons to the status of modern 
nations, in thought and in substance.”219 Arabic, with its rhetorical emphasis on 
emotions and desires, and its vocabulary drawn from a primitive, desert lifestyle was 
not suited to the modern requirements of logic, clarity, and accuracy.220 Furthermore, he 
reminds people again of the noble, human aspect of adopting a Latin alphabet, which 
would join Egypt to a culture shared by one billion “civilized human beings,” 
transforming “separation into connectivity” and “dispute into harmony – and in all of 
this is peace, love, and humanity.”221 Alluding to the Turkish example once again, he 
warns critics against playing the religion card, “for of the world's 300 million Muslims, 
only 60 million of them write Arabic; besides, the alphabet used for the Muslim Turkish 
language is a Latin script.”222 
 
Throughout his chapters on language and modernization, the vicious tone of Musa's 
arguments as well as his condemnatory attitude towards Arabic and the culture of those 
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who identify with it make his work seem more like an attack rather than a practical 
ideology which could attract average Egyptian sympathizers. A large segment of the 
Egyptian population, especially those who were religiously-inclined Muslims, would 
have reason to take offense at his view that “many of the crimes committed in Egypt 
are...first and foremost linguistic crimes motivated by a fossilized language serving a 
fossilized religion.”223 However, the severity of his criticisms of Arabic and of 
whomever he identified as reactionaries helped gain his work widespread attention, and 
his writings were some of the notable few language reform proposals that went as far as 
calling for a full-fledged replacement of Arabic with a foreign alphabet.  
 
                                                
223 Suleiman, War of Words, 44. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
The authors whose works are presented in this thesis were part of a world that was 
undergoing many changes. Some of them had gone from being subjects of an empire, to 
actively participating in the struggle for the establishment of independent Arab nation 
states. Through war, the fall of the Ottoman empire, the triumph of a Turkish Muslim 
state (in character and perception, if not in name) in the face of European colonialism, 
and the loss of the most important symbol of unified Muslim power that occurred with 
the abolition of the caliphate, shared heritages and relationships were constantly being 
reevaluated and reshaped. Examining intellectual writings from the Arab world in the 
1920s, 30s, and 40s on the Turkish alphabet reform offers important insight into how 
these intellectuals conceived of their identity and the position of their societies in the 
world, and the connection this had with the language they spoke and wrote. Importantly, 
their works are valuable sites for exploring the Arab-Turkish relationship within the 
context of language.  
 
The writings examined in this thesis underline the fact that Arabs of diverse 
backgrounds and perspectives were aware of and interested in language-related 
developments taking place in Turkey at the time. Some of them, such as the authors 
featured in al-Manar, were concerned about the Turkish script change from a religious 
perspective, viewing the change as an attack against Islam and an effort to rid Turkey of 
its Muslim identity. For them, the Arabic script was an important symbol of Islam, 
visually representing the word of God and unifying not only Arabs but Muslims from all 
corners of the umma.  
 
For others whose predominant ideology was that of Arab or Egyptian nationalism, the 
alphabet reform in Turkey could be interpreted in multiple ways. Some, like al-Khuri, 
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accepted the change for Turkey but rejected the notion that a similar reform should be 
implemented in the Arab world. Not only did he view European Orientalist proposals to 
Latinize the Arabic script as a devious instrument of colonialism by which to divide 
various Arab peoples, Latinizing the Arabic script represented an attack on a valuable 
Arab linguistic heritage and cultural continuity which stretched back far before Islam. 
As a language with a noble heritage and superior linguistic qualities, he preferred to 
preserve the Arabic script while tackling the modern question of how to facilitate Arabic 
printing by looking for simplifying solutions within the current script itself.  
Maintaining the Arabic script would avoid any loss of connection to heritage and 
history, a concern noted in the Kemalist example of Turkey. 
 
Yet others pointed to the Arabic script to explain what they saw as the disturbing 
condition of their nations' backwardness. These authors concerned themselves not with 
restoring former glory to religion-based conceptions of an umma, nor with reaching 
back to the past as a means of attributing value to the present. For them, the only hope 
for their societies to progress was by modernizing along the lines of western 
development and industrialization. A complete replacement of what they believed to be 
a defunct and cumbersome script with a new, Latin-based alphabet that was well-suited 
to modern scientific education was a crucial first step in the process of modernization. 
Furthermore, a new, modern script would cause people to reevaluate their own 
perceptions of their identity, in addition to marking their nations as new and modern for 
others. For these authors, the Turkish alphabet reform was an inspiring success whose 
example they hoped could be emulated by their own peoples.   
 
Arab intellectuals' perspectives on the Turkish alphabet reform resist predictability. To 
take one example from the works cited, al-Khuri and Musa share some similarities in 
background; both were nationalists, and both came from Christian backgrounds, 
although Musa was Coptic, unlike most Christians of Syria. Both of them attribute to 
scripts the quality of defining, in very large part, what it means to be Arab, Syrian, or 
Egyptian, but the way they conceptualize the issue at hand is vastly different. Al-Khuri 
applies a critical approach that acknowledges shortcomings of the Arabic script in the 
modern context, and looks for creative and economic solutions within the script itself. 
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He draws on the past as a source of validation of Arabic's 'noble pedigree,' insisting on 
the need to preserve the language and its script from foreign tampering. For al-Khuri, 
the Turkish model is not one to be emulated by Syria, as he takes into account differing 
historical and geographical factors that make the positions of each of the two countries 
unique. Musa, on the other hand, in his complete dismissal of any possible virtues of the 
Arabic script, only locates value for Egypt in its ability to distance itself from Arabic 
and pursue the European modernization project, applauding what he saw as Turkey's 
success at transforming the character and outlook of an overwhelmingly Muslim state 
into that of a European nation. 
 
Despite the diversity of these authors' backgrounds, ideologies, and approaches, what is 
common to all their works is a firm belief in the integral link between script and 
identity, or how the alphabet one uses to write one's language helps them to define who 
they are, and serves as a group marker that identifies them with and to others. 
Approaching the issue from various angles, these authors strongly felt that the alphabet 
reform in Turkey was more than an isolated development; instead, it pertained to them 
and had repercussions for their connected societies in one way or another.  
 
There is a wealth of Arabic sources on the Turkish language and script reforms still to 
be studied. A possibility for future research might be to examine contemporary Arab 
popular media coverage of the 1928 alphabet law, using newspapers from major cities to 
compare the coverage with the approaches of the intellectuals whose works are explored 
in the present thesis. News reporting can act as an agenda-setter for the issues that 
audiences 'should' focus on and be concerned about. The way its function of interpreting 
events and providing analysis and commentary is carried out can also indicate what the 
public is interested in.224 News coverage is a useful place to look for how images of the 
“other” are manifested.225 Arabic newspaper archives from the late 1920s and early 30s 
are a potentially valuable venue for further exploration of the topic. 
 
                                                
224 Rasha A. Abdulla, “Arab Media Over the Past Twenty Years: Opportunities and Challenges,” in The 
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University in Cairo Press, 2010), 62. 
225 Noha Mellor, The Making of Arab News (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2005), 42. 
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Another possible area for future study would be a comparative analysis of coverage of 
the Turkish alphabet reform, or broader language reform efforts, in two Arabic 
magazines of diverse outlooks but of comparable influence and reach, such as al-Manar 
and al-Hilal. A search for support of the Turkish alphabet change, and even more 
drastically, the call for the Latinization of the Arabic script from thinkers of explicitly 
religiously-conservative background would also be useful in adding to the spectrum of 
diverse perspectives analyzed in this thesis.   
 
Why does it matter to study how Arabs perceived of Turkey within any given context, 
or how relations and mutual perceptions of these groups operated in the past? Beyond 
being of value, at the most basic level, to a more nuanced understanding of history, 
research that explores the many facets of Turkish-Arab relations provides us with an 
indispensable link between the past and the direction of behavior in the future. As Arabs 
become increasingly interconnected with Turkey today, and ever more interested in and 
aware of its domestic and international affairs, their perceptions and opinions of the 
country and its people become more complex. Similarly, a revival within Turkish 
society of interest in Turkey's Ottoman heritage and the domains of the former empire 
both at the scholarly and public levels through degree programs, conferences, social 
media outlets, and even politics contributes to the process of shifting perceptions and 
redefining relations. 
 
With Turkey increasingly being deemed a role model for developing Arab countries in 
the wake of the Arab Spring,226 the Arab world will continue to eye Turkey with great 
interest, especially in areas such as the relationship between religion and politics, and 
relationships between nations. Historical research on relations and perceptions in the 
past is of benefit in thinking about how these groups will move forward together, dictate 
policies about each other, create opportunities for cooperation and positive change, and 
simply interact with each other outside the confines of stereotypes, negative images, and 
Othering. 
                                                
226 Bülent Aras and Karakaya Polat, “Turkey and the Middle East: Frontiers of the New Geographic 
Imagination,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 61:4 (2007): 478.  
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